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ABSTRACT 
  Created to supervise the distribution of Veterans Administration 
benefits, the Veterans Benefit Administration Fiduciary Program was 
designed to help thousands of incompetent veterans handle their 
finances. Rather than directly managing each veteran’s funds, the 
Fiduciary Program employs a privatization model whereby a private 
individual or institution is appointed to manage a veteran’s assets. The 
Fiduciary Program then monitors these fiduciaries to ensure the 
veteran’s funds are properly expended. 
  This Note argues that in practice this privatization model is 
seriously flawed and that it exposes some of the most vulnerable 
portions of the veteran population’s funds to misuse. In support of 
this conclusion, this Note compares the federal statutes, regulations, 
and internal directives that govern the Fiduciary Program—paying 
special attention to the Fiduciary Program Manual—with audits 
performed by the Veterans Affairs Office of Audits and Evaluations 
and the U.S. Government Accountability Office. Relying on these 
audits, this inquiry rejects total reliance on substantive statutory 
reform in light of legislative and judicial barriers. Instead, this Note 
advocates for critical internal reforms designed to improve the 
Program’s efficiency and functionality, the adoption of a state 
enforcement mechanism, and reliance on principles of cooperative 
federalism and interagency cooperation. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Billy Brown’s military service in Korea earned him benefits from 
the U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) for life.1 To help Billy 
Brown manage those benefits in his old age, the VA appointed 
Marcus Brown (no relation), a cabinet maker with a high-school 
diploma and no financial training, to serve as the veteran’s mandatory 
personal-finance manager (fiduciary).2 Neither Billy Brown nor his 
family had any input in Marcus Brown’s appointment.3 Once 
appointed, Marcus Brown controlled all of Billy Brown’s income, 
including his monthly VA checks and his life savings, which totaled 
more than $100,000.4 In exchange for this service, the VA required 
Billy Brown to pay Marcus Brown a portion of his VA check each 
month.5 
The methods used to manage Billy Brown’s finances and the 
finances of those similarly situated raise serious concerns about 
fundamental fairness and functionality; in fact, those methods 
threaten to undermine the core purpose of the VA—the protection of 
vulnerable veterans. The VA faces an increasing array of challenges 
resulting from insufficient resources, an overloaded system, and 
never-before-seen hurdles.6 That said, solutions to these problems do 
not uniformly require an outpouring of financial resources or an army 
of staff. Indeed, as this Note argues, the VA’s Fiduciary Program 
provides at least one example of a VA program that could instead 
benefit from reforms focused on increased efficiency and oversight. 
 
 1. John Schwartz, Instead of Helping, Trustee Program Is Hurting Veterans, Families Say, 
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 8, 2011, at A16. For more information regarding the federal benefits awarded 
to veterans, see generally U.S. DEP’T OF VETERANS AFFAIRS, FEDERAL BENEFITS FOR 
VETERANS, DEPENDENTS AND SURVIVORS (2013), available at http://www.va.gov/opa/
publications/benefits_book/2013_Federal_Benefits_for_Veterans_English.pdf.  
 2. Schwartz, supra note 1. The VA’s Fiduciary Program defines a “fiduciary” as “a person 
or legal entity (such as a bank) charged with the duty of managing the estate of an incompetent 
beneficiary.” U.S. DEP’T OF VETERANS AFFAIRS, FIDUCIARY PROGRAM MANUAL, ch. 1, 
§ A.4.e (2005), available at http://www.benefits.va.gov/FIDUCIARY/references.asp. VA-
supervised fiduciaries can include either court-appointed fiduciaries or federal fiduciaries. Id. 
 3. Schwartz, supra note 1.  
 4. Id. 
 5. Id.; see U.S. DEP’T OF VETERANS AFFAIRS, supra note 2, ch. 2, § E.29 (authorizing 
federal fiduciaries to collect fees). 
 6. See, e.g., Thomas J. Reed, Parallel Lines Never Meet: Why the Military Disability 
Retirement and Veterans Affairs Department Claim Adjudication Systems Are a Failure, 19 
WIDENER L.J. 57, 59−60 (2009) (addressing the systemic problems associated with distributing 
VA benefits). 
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The Fiduciary Program is a classic example of agency 
privatization at work. In a world of limited resources, privatization—
the process by which a government agency uses “private means to 
achieve public ends”7—has become a permanent fixture in federal, 
state, and local government.8 Federal law requires VA beneficiaries 
deemed incapable of managing their personal finances due to injury, 
disease, or infirmities of age to receive help managing their money.9 
To minimize the number of VA employees required to run the 
Fiduciary Program, the VA instead either finds volunteers or uses the 
veterans’ funds to hire private citizens or organizations to manage the 
veterans’ finances.10 Government employees working for the VA then 
monitor these private money managers to make sure they properly 
handle the veterans’ funds.11 In theory, privatizing this system 
increases the number of incompetent veterans receiving help while 
simultaneously empowering the Fiduciary Program to shift from 
administering the Program to monitoring fiduciaries. 
Serving approximately one hundred thirty-four thousand 
incompetent beneficiaries,12 the Fiduciary Program’s sole mission is to 
provide oversight to ensure that incompetent veterans’ financial 
resources are managed effectively.13 As it currently exists, however, 
the Fiduciary Program inadequately protects incompetent 
beneficiaries. The VA Office of the Inspector General (VA OIG)14 
 
 7. Sidney A. Shapiro, Outsourcing Government Regulation, 53 DUKE L.J. 389, 389 (2003). 
 8. Nestor M. Davidson, Relational Contracts in the Privatization of Social Welfare: The 
Case of Housing, 24 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 263, 263 (2006).  
 9. U.S. DEP’T OF VETERANS AFFAIRS, supra note 1, at 41–42. Individuals entitled to 
receive VA benefits are called beneficiaries. U.S. DEP’T OF VETERANS AFFAIRS, supra note 2, 
ch. 1, § A.4.c. Beneficiaries are classified as “minors,” “veterans,” and “other adults, including” 
“helpless adults,” “surviving spouses,” “dependent parents, and” “insurance proceeds 
recipients.” Id.  
 10. See 38 U.S.C. § 5502(a)(1) (2006) (“Where it appears to the Secretary [of Veterans 
Affairs] that the interest of the beneficiary would be served thereby, payment of benefits under 
any law administered by the Secretary may be made directly to the beneficiary or to a relative 
or some other fiduciary for the use and benefit of the beneficiary, regardless of any legal 
disability on the part of the beneficiary.”).  
 11. See 38 C.F.R. § 13.100(a) (2013) (authorizing Veterans Service Center Managers 
(VSCMs) to supervise fiduciaries). 
 12. VETERANS BENEFITS ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF VETERANS AFFAIRS, ANNUAL BENEFITS 
REPORT: FISCAL YEAR 2012, at 41 (2013), available at http://www.vba.va.gov/REPORTS/
abr/2012_abr.pdf. 
 13. U.S. DEP’T OF VETERANS AFFAIRS, supra note 1, at 41. 
 14. The VA OIG is the investigative arm of the Secretary of Veterans Affairs, and its 
Office of Audits and Evaluations is designed to “provide[] independent evaluations of VA’s 
activities in order to ensure the integrity of [VA operations].” About the Office of Audits and 
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concluded in 2010 that the Fiduciary Program was inadequate and 
posed a threat to “approximately $161 million” belonging to veterans 
or their families.15 Unfavorable reports from the VA OIG triggered 
further inquiry by the House Committee on Veterans’ Affairs in 
2003.16 Since 2003, various subcommittees within the House 
Committee on Veterans’ Affairs have held three additional hearings 
seeking to pressure the VA to address the Fiduciary Program’s 
shortcomings.17 And in 2010, after separately reviewing the Fiduciary 
Program’s performance, the Government Accountability Office 
(GAO) confirmed the VA OIG’s reports.18 In light of these findings, 
the House of Representatives passed a bill amending the framework 
of the Fiduciary Program to better protect incompetent veterans in 
2012.19 But despite budding legislative change, critical reports, and 
 
Evaluations, U.S. DEP’T OF VETERANS AFF., http://www.va.gov/oig/about/audit.asp (last visited 
Feb. 9, 2014). 
 15. OFFICE OF AUDITS & EVALUATIONS, U.S. DEP’T OF VETERANS AFFAIRS, NO. 09-
01999-120, VETERANS BENEFITS ADMINISTRATION: AUDIT OF THE FIDUCIARY PROGRAM’S 
EFFECTIVENESS IN ADDRESSING POTENTIAL MISUSE OF BENEFICIARY FUNDS 10−14 (2010). 
The Fiduciary Program’s shortcomings originally came to the attention of the VA OIG in 2003 
following a routine investigation of several VA regional offices. OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., 
U.S. DEP’T OF VETERANS AFFAIRS, NO. 04-00034-141, COMBINED ASSESSMENT PROGRAM 
REVIEW OF THE VA REGIONAL OFFICE: DETROIT, MICHIGAN i–ii, 1−2 (2004). 
 16. Department of Veterans Affairs’ Fiduciary Program: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on 
Benefits of the H. Comm. on Veterans’ Affairs, 108th Cong. 1 (2003) (statement of Rep. Henry 
Brown, Chairman, Subcomm. on Benefits). 
 17. Legislative Hearing on H.R. 2985, H.R. 3730, H.R. 4481, H.R. 5948: Hearing Before the 
Subcomm. on Oversight & Investigations of the H. Comm. on Veterans’ Affairs, 112th Cong. 
(2012) [hereinafter Legislative Hearing]; Reforming VA’s Flawed Fiduciary System: Hearing 
Before the Subcomm. on Oversight & Investigations of the H. Comm. on Veterans’ Affairs, 112th 
Cong. (2012) [hereinafter Reforming VA’s Flawed Fiduciary System]; see Examining the U.S. 
Department of Veterans Affairs Fiduciary Program: How Can VA Better Protect Vulnerable 
Veterans and Their Families?: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Disability Assistance & Mem’l 
Affairs of the H. Comm. on Veterans’ Affairs, 111th Cong. 2–3 (2010) [hereinafter Examining the 
Fiduciary Program] (statement of Rep. John J. Hall, Chairman, Subcomm. on Disability 
Assistance & Mem’l Affairs) (outlining some of the concerns raised by the VA OIG and the 
Government Accountability Office (GAO)).  
 18. See generally U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-11-678, INCAPACITATED 
ADULTS: OVERSIGHT OF FEDERAL FIDUCIARIES AND COURT-APPOINTED GUARDIANS 
NEEDS IMPROVEMENT (2011), available at http://www.gao.gov/assets/330/321761.pdf 
[hereinafter GAO, INCAPACITATED ADULTS] (identifying deficiencies in the Fiduciary 
Program and areas for improvement); U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-10-241, 
VA’S FIDUCIARY PROGRAM: IMPROVED COMPLIANCE AND POLICIES COULD BETTER 
SAFEGUARD VETERANS’ BENEFITS (2010), available at http://www.gao.gov/assets/
310/301237.pdf [hereinafter GAO, VA’S FIDUCIARY PROGRAM] (recommending additional 
oversight, monitoring, and training of fiduciaries).  
 19. H.R. 5948, 112th Cong. (2012); see H.R. REP. NO. 112-678, at 13−16 (2012) (describing 
the purposes of the bill). For a discussion of this amendment, see Part III.A. 
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other calls to action, the amendment stalled in the Senate in 2012.20 
Although an almost identical bill was revived for the 113th legislative 
session,21 the amended legislation is currently awaiting a full vote of 
the House Committee on Veterans’ Affairs.22 
Given such widely identified deficiencies and to-date 
unsuccessful attempts to remedy them, this Note seeks to chart a new 
course in thinking about how to best reform the Fiduciary Program. 
In so doing, it makes two contributions to existing legal scholarship.23 
First, it seeks to navigate the framework of rules and regulations that 
govern the Fiduciary Program to provide insight for those trying to 
help incompetent veterans assert their legal rights. Second, this Note 
argues that effective reform of the Fiduciary Program requires critical 
internal reforms, the adoption of a state enforcement mechanism, and 
reliance on principles of cooperative federalism and interagency 
cooperation. In arguing for these reforms, this approach stands in 
stark contrast to another proposed solution: total reliance on 
substantive statutory reform. Such reform, this Note submits, cannot 
overcome the political hurdles or enforcement issues inherent in 
social-welfare programs without the aid of the courts. Judicial review, 
moreover, provides an unsatisfactory avenue for beneficiaries to 
vindicate their rights; federal law limits their available judicial forum 
to the Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims (CAVC), which is 
plagued by insufficient judicial resources and numerous jurisdictional 
hurdles. 
This Note will proceed in four parts. Part I provides an overview 
of the Fiduciary Program, explaining how the Program works in 
theory. Part II examines the Program’s identifiable flaws through an 
examination of three critical problems. Part III identifies why a new 
 
 20. See H.R. 5948 (112th): Veterans Fiduciary Reform and Honoring Noble Service Act, 
GOVTRACK.US, https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/112/hr5948#overview (last visited Feb. 9, 
2014). 
 21. H.R. 894, 113th Cong. (2013). 
 22. H.R. 894: To Amend Title 38, United States Code, To Improve the Supervision of 
Fiduciaries of Veterans Under the Laws Administered by the Secretary of Veterans Affairs, 
GOVTRACK.US, https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/113/hr894 (last visited Feb. 9, 2014). 
 23. Although there has been no scholarship on the Fiduciary Program, there have been a 
few articles written about the Representative Payment Program, the Social Security 
Administration’s (SSA) version of the Fiduciary Program. See generally Margaret G. Farrell, 
Administrative Paternalism: Social Security’s Representative Payment Program and Two Models 
of Justice, 14 CARDOZO L. REV. 283 (1992); Margaret G. Farrell, Doing unto Others: A 
Proposal for Participatory Justice in Social Security’s Representative Payment Program, 53 U. 
PITT. L. REV. 883 (1992); Samuel Saks, Representative Payment Under the Social Security 
Protection Act of 2004, 51 WAYNE L. REV. 1569 (2005). 
BOSWORTH IN PP (FLIP) (DO NOT DELETE) 3/16/2014  8:21 PM 
1508 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 63:1503 
statutory scheme cannot effectively respond to the Fiduciary 
Program’s challenges in light of the limitations on judicial review. 
Part IV proposes alternative mechanisms for reform including 
interagency cooperation, parallel state enforcement, and vigorous 
advocacy by individuals. 
I.  THE FIDUCIARY PROGRAM ON PAPER 
Originally created in 1935,24 the Fiduciary Program, managed 
under the Veterans Benefit Administration (VBA) division of the 
VA,25 protects the benefits of those whom the VA deems incapable of 
managing their personal finances.26 Once the VA determines a 
beneficiary is unable to manage his or her financial affairs, the 
beneficiary is deemed incompetent and the Fiduciary Program 
appoints a private citizen or organization as the incompetent 
beneficiary’s fiduciary.27 Once appointed, the fiduciary is responsible 
for ensuring that the veteran’s funds are expended for “the care, 
support, welfare and needs of the beneficiary and their recognized 
dependents.”28 In fiscal year 2012, the Fiduciary Program included 
 
 24. Act of Aug. 12, 1935, ch. 510, 49 Stat. 607. 
 25. The Fiduciary Program is “administered by VA Regional Offices (VAROs) and their 
respective Offices of Regional Counsel (ORC) that deal directly with VA beneficiaries and 
State courts in guardianship and commitment matters.” OFFICE OF AUDITS & EVALUATIONS, 
supra note 15, at 1; see 38 U.S.C. § 5502(a)(1) (2006) (authorizing the payment of benefits to 
fiduciaries “for the use and benefit of [beneficiaries]”); see also id. § 512 (authorizing the 
Secretary of Veterans Affairs to delegate that authority to lower-level employees). The 
Secretary of the VA delegates his authority to appoint fiduciaries to the VSCM at each regional 
office. 38 C.F.R. § 13.55 (2013).  
 26. U.S. DEP’T OF VETERANS AFFAIRS, supra note 1, at 41–42. The Fiduciary Program not 
only serves veterans but also protects all incompetent beneficiaries. For the Program’s 
definition of “beneficiary,” see supra note 9. 
 27. U.S. DEP’T OF VETERANS AFFAIRS, supra note 1, at 39. Federal law empowers the VA 
to appoint a private citizen to manage a veteran’s finances. See 38 U.S.C. § 5502(a)(1) (“Where 
it appears to the Secretary [of Veterans Affairs] that the interest of the beneficiary would be 
served thereby, payment of benefits under any law administered by the Secretary may be made 
directly to the beneficiary or to a relative or some other fiduciary for the use and benefit of the 
beneficiary, regardless of any legal disability on the part of the beneficiary.”); see also 38 C.F.R. 
§ 13.55(a) (describing the different types of federal fiduciaries, including legal custodians and 
institutional payees). Although the Fiduciary Program guidelines do not explicitly reference the 
appointment of private individuals to serve as paid fiduciaries, the fact that “dependents or 
close relatives” are generally not allowed to receive a commission, combined with the regular 
use of commissions, implies that private individuals and institutions can be appointed as paid 
fiduciaries. See U.S. DEP’T OF VETERANS AFFAIRS, supra note 2, ch. 2, § E.29.b. 
 28. U.S. DEP’T OF VETERANS AFFAIRS, FEDERAL BENEFITS FOR VETERANS, 
DEPENDENTS AND SURVIVORS 39 (2012), available at http://www.va.gov/opa/publications/
benefits_book/2012_federal_benefits_ebook_final.pdf. 
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134,128 beneficiaries receiving a total of $2,337,816,110 in VA 
benefits.29 
Because the Fiduciary Program involves money management for 
individuals extremely susceptible to abuse, there is ample opportunity 
for misuse.30 To protect these vulnerable beneficiaries, federal law 
establishes minimum threshold requirements related to the selection 
and monitoring of VA fiduciaries.31 The VA provides further 
guidance through regulations that flesh out the federal 
requirements.32 In addition, the VBA, the subset of the VA 
responsible for administering the Fiduciary Program, routinely issues 
further guidance in the form of fast letters,33 training letters,34 and 
manuals.35 This guidance details the Fiduciary Program’s internal 
processes and functions and is instrumental in the daily 
administration of the Fiduciary Program.36 In practice, fast letters 
“introduce new laws before they become regulations,” “adjust 
guidance from the [VBA Fiduciary Manual (the Manual)] with 
 
 29. VETERANS BENEFITS ADMIN., supra note 12, at 41. By categorizing the data based on 
the type of fiduciary retained by each beneficiary, the Benefits Report fails to account for 
fiduciaries providing services to multiple veterans. As such, the Benefits Report does not 
identify the actual number of fiduciaries in the system.  
 30. Cf. Saks, supra note 23, at 1578–79 (discussing the dangers inherent to a beneficiary 
under the SSA’s fiduciary program).  
 31. See, e.g., 38 U.S.C. § 5507(a)(1)(C) (requiring a credit report for proposed fiduciaries to 
the extent practicable); id. § 5507(b) (requiring investigators to inquire into a proposed 
fiduciary’s criminal background).  
 32. See, e.g., 38 C.F.R. § 13.105 (indicating which types of fiduciaries may be required to 
provide bonds).   
 33. Fast letters are written and published by the Director of the Fiduciary Program and 
transmit information and instructions to local VA offices about changes or policies relating to 
the Fiduciary Program. Jeffrey Parker, Two Perspectives on Legal Authority Within the 
Department of Veterans Affairs Adjudication, 1 VETERANS L. REV. 208, 210 n.21 (2009). For 
examples of fast letters, see Garcia v. Shinseki, No. 11-1924, 2011 WL 4448186, at 3–4 & n.3 
(Vet. App. Sept. 27, 2011); Fast Letter 13-29, Fiscal Year 2014 National Training Curriculum for 
Fiduciary Hub and Manila Office Fiduciary Personnel (Nov. 14, 2013), available at 
https://www.ttande.org/VBA_Learning_Catalog/Pension/FL/FL13-029_SOP.doc; Fast Letter 04-
11, Processing Claims Releasing Retroactive Benefits to Beneficiaries Under Fiduciary 
Supervision (May 17, 2011), available at http://www.legion.org/documents/legion/
pdf/VA&R_Bulletin_4_11_11.pdf; References, Fast Letters and Forms, U.S. DEP’T VETERANS 
AFF., http://benefits.va.gov/fiduciary/references.asp (last visited Feb. 9, 2014). 
 34. For an example of a training letter, see Training Letter 11-04, From Thomas J. Murphy, 
Dir., Compensation Serv., Veterans Benefits Admin., to All VA Regional Offices, Processing 
Virtual VA Electronic VA Form 21-592, Request for Appointment of a Fiduciary, Custodian, or 
Guardian, Documents (Sept. 20, 2011), available at http://www.vfwilserviceoffice.com/upload/
TL%2011-04%20Fidicuary%20Processing.doc. 
 35. E.g., U.S. DEP’T OF VETERANS AFFAIRS, supra note 2. 
 36. Parker, supra note 33, at 210 & n.19.  
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pending changes,” and “co-ordinate action between divisions in a 
regional office.”37 Fast letters are easy to issue and revoke, providing 
the Program with substantial flexibility.38 These directives, however, 
may not be considered binding law,39 making it difficult to hold 
Fiduciary Program employees accountable for following or failing to 
follow the issued directives.40 
Setting aside numerous nuances and qualifications beyond the 
scope of this Note, the structure of the Fiduciary Program is fairly 
straightforward: After determining that a veteran is incapable of 
managing his or her personal finances,41 the Fiduciary Program 
assigns an employee (the investigator) to select a fiduciary for the 
veteran.42 The investigator interviews the beneficiary and any 
potential applicants for the position of fiduciary before making a 
selection.43 If the investigator determines that no suitable fiduciary is 
available to serve for free, a portion of the beneficiary’s money can be 
used to pay a fiduciary to manage the beneficiary’s finances.44 
 
 37. N.D. DEP’T OF VETERANS AFFAIRS, TRAINING, RESPONSIBILITY, INVOLVEMENT, AND 
PREPARATION OF CLAIMS, ch. 3, at 10, available at http://www.nd.gov/veterans/files/resource/
Chapter%203%20-%20Reference%20Materials.pdf. 
 38. Parker, supra note 33, at 217; see, e.g., Fast Letter 12-13, From David R. McLenachen, 
Dir., Pension and Fiduciary Servs., Veterans Benefits Admin., to All Veterans Service Center 
and Fiduciary Hubs Personnel, Pre-approval of Single Expenditures by a Fiduciary (Apr. 19, 
2012), available at http://benefits.va.gov/fiduciary/FL12-013.doc (rescinding Fast Letter 09-42, 
which had been issued in October 2009, and clarifying the expenditure-review policy outlined in 
the Manual). 
 39. See 38 C.F.R. § 19.5 (“In consideration of appeals, the Board [of Veterans’ 
Appeals] . . . is not bound by Department manuals, circulars, or similar administrative issues.”). 
 40. For further discussion of this issue, see infra notes 196–203. 
 41. See 38 C.F.R. § 13.55(a) (limiting the use of fiduciaries to those beneficiaries who are 
physically or legally disabled). Although determining a beneficiary’s competence is a source of 
substantial controversy, this Note focuses exclusively on the administration of the Fiduciary 
Program after the determination of competence is made.  
 42. See 38 U.S.C. § 5507(a)(2) (2006) (endowing the VA with broad discretion to 
determine whether the proposed fiduciary’s certification is “in the interest of [the] 
beneficiary”).  
 43. See id. (requiring face-to-face interviews with beneficiaries and fiduciaries when 
practicable). Waiver of an in-person examination is only acceptable when a proposed fiduciary 
is a state or local government agency that is already serving as a VA fiduciary with a recent 
history of compliance with VA policy (for example, by timely filing their accountings). U.S. 
DEP’T OF VETERANS AFFAIRS, supra note 2, ch. 2, § D.11.m. 
 44. 38 U.S.C. § 5502(a)(2). Necessity exists only when “the beneficiary’s best interest 
would be served by the appointment of a qualified professional, or, if a qualified professional is 
not available, the proposed fiduciary is the only qualified person available and is not willing to 
serve without a fee.” 38 C.F.R. § 13.64(a). Only approximately 8 percent of all beneficiaries pay 
a commission. Stephen Spotswood, Recent Investigations Question VA’s Paid Fiduciary Program 
for Disabled Veterans, U.S. MED., Mar. 2012, at 6. 
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The investigator has wide discretion in selecting a fiduciary, but 
there are a few federal laws involved in the selection process: The 
investigator must review a proposed fiduciary’s recent credit report,45 
check his or her criminal history,46 and provide “adequate evidence” 
that the proposed fiduciary’s selection is in the interest of the 
beneficiary (though what constitutes “adequate evidence” is largely 
undefined).47 The investigator also decides whether to protect the 
veteran’s funds using a bond.48 Once selected, the fiduciary is 
responsible for ensuring that the beneficiary has basic necessities 
including food, shelter, and medical expenses. The fiduciary is also 
responsible for paying all bills and income taxes on time, collecting 
any rent or unpaid debts on behalf of the beneficiary, and purchasing 
insurance if needed.49 After selection, a different employee (the 
auditor) monitors the fiduciary’s spending through periodic financial 
 
 45. See 38 U.S.C. § 5507(a)(1)(C) (requiring the VA to determine the fitness of the 
proposed fiduciary by reviewing a credit report, issued within one year of the date of the 
proposed appointment to the extent practicable). Credit scores are widely regarded as a useful 
indicator of financial responsibility, providing important “information about one’s responsibility 
and stability, stress level, and distractibility” to create an accurate picture of the individual’s 
risk-assessment behavior. Patrick L. Brockett & Linda L. Golden, Biological and 
Psychobehavioral Correlates of Credit Scores and Automobile Insurance Losses: Toward an 
Explication of Why Credit Scoring Works, 74 J. RISK & INS. 23, 26 (2007). 
 46. See 38 U.S.C. § 5507(b) (mandating that the VA inquire whether the proposed 
fiduciary has been convicted of any offense that resulted in imprisonment for more than one 
year). 
 47. Id. § 5507(a)(2). In narrowing selection standards, VA regulations require all 
determinations to be made based on the “best interest of the beneficiary.” 38 C.F.R. § 3.850 
(emphasis added). Though the best-interest standard remains undefined, the Manual provides 
specific instructions to help field examiners select the best fiduciary. U.S. DEP’T VETERANS 
AFFAIRS, supra note 2, ch. 2, § E.28; see also Freeman v. Shinseki, 24 Vet. App. 404, 416–17 
(2011) (per curiam) (finding sufficient regulatory guidance to allow the court to review the 
selection of fiduciaries).  
 48. See 38 U.S.C. § 5507(a)(3) (granting the VA discretion to require a bond). VA 
regulations clarify which types of fiduciaries might be required to provide bonds. See 38 C.F.R. 
§ 13.105(a) (listing “legal custodian, custodian-in-fact or chief officer of a [qualified] private 
institution” as those federal fiduciaries that the VSCM may require to provide bonds). Bond 
payments are made by the beneficiary’s estate. Examining the Fiduciary Program, supra note 17, 
at 41 (statement of Gary Chesterson, Chief of Fiduciary Program Staff, Veterans Benefits 
Administration, U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs).  
 49. PENSION & FIDUCIARY SERV., U.S. DEP’T OF VETERANS AFFAIRS, A GUIDE FOR VA 
FIDUCIARIES 4 (2013), available at http://benefits.va.gov/FIDUCIARY/Fid_Guide.pdf; see also 
Fiduciary, U.S. DEP’T VETERANS AFF., http://www.benefits.va.gov/fiduciary/fiduciary.asp (last 
visited Feb. 9, 2014) (describing a fiduciary’s potential responsibilities). 
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statements called accountings50 and periodic personal visits to the 
beneficiary.51 The auditor is expected to “aggressive[ly]” follow up on 
delinquent accountings to ensure the fiduciary is complying with 
Fiduciary Program policy52 while simultaneously looking for 
indicators of misuse.53 If the fiduciary performs unsatisfactorily and 
informal efforts by the local Veterans Service Center Manager 
(VSCM) fail to correct the fiduciary’s deficiency, the case will be 
referred to the VA Regional counsel.54 If a misuse determination is 
made, the matter will be referred to the VA Office of Investigations 
for further review.55 If the VA OIG finds “a prima facie case of 
misappropriation, embezzlement or a violation of the Federal 
statutes,” the case may be submitted to the U.S. Attorney’s office for 
potential prosecution.56 
Several different punishments exist for failure to comply with 
Program policy and/or misuse of funds. First, a Fiduciary Program 
employee can terminate fiduciaries who misuse funds or fail to follow 
Fiduciary Program rules and appoint a successor fiduciary at any 
time.57 Additionally, under federal law, misappropriation and 
embezzlement by a fiduciary is punishable by up to five years’ 
imprisonment.58 Beyond potential criminal prosecution, federal law 
provides a cause of action for negligence against the government “in 
any case in which the negligent failure of the Secretary to investigate 
or monitor a fiduciary [resulted] in misuse of benefits by the 
fiduciary.”59 If the VA is found negligent, federal law requires the VA 
to “pay the beneficiary or the beneficiary’s successor fiduciary an 
amount equal to the amount of benefits that were so misused.”60  
 
 50. See U.S. DEP’T OF VETERANS AFFAIRS, supra note 2, ch. 3, § C.7 (requiring 
accountings for several different types of federal fiduciaries). Required accountings can be 
waived for any federal fiduciary under appropriate circumstances. Id. ch. 2, § E.28.b.  
 51. See id. ch. 2, § E.33.c (detailing the timeline for secondary field examinations).  
 52. See id. ch. 3, §§ C.12.a–b (citing 38 U.S.C. § 6107) (providing a step-by-step table 
describing the appropriate technique for handling delinquent accounts). 
 53. Id. ch. 2, § A.2.f. For guidance on misuse investigations, see generally id. ch. 5. 
 54. 38 C.F.R. § 13.100(c) (2013). 
 55. U.S. DEP’T OF VETERANS AFFAIRS, supra note 2, ch. 5, § F.18.  
 56. 38 C.F.R. § 13.100(d).  
 57. Id. § 13.100(a)(2). 
 58. 38 U.S.C. § 6101(a)(2) (2006). 
 59. Id. § 6107(a)(1). In this context, a negligent failure exists when the VA fails to review 
an accounting or follow up an allegation of abuse within sixty days. Id. § 6107(a)(2).  
 60. Id. § 6107(a)(1). 
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II.  THE FIDUCIARY PROGRAM AS APPLIED 
In practice, the Fiduciary Program struggles to effectively protect 
vulnerable beneficiaries from abuse. A woman serving as a fiduciary 
for her injured son recently described her experiences with the 
Fiduciary Program as “disturbing,” citing among many problems a 
complete lack of guidance about Fiduciary Program requirements, 
difficulty contacting Program employees, and inconsistent reports as 
to whether she had complied with Program procedures.61 According 
to the Wounded Warrior Project, a charity supporting wounded 
veterans, her description is an accurate reflection of community 
experiences.62 
Rather than exhaustively detailing the Program’s flaws, this Note 
highlights three major problems illustrative of the Program’s 
shortcomings as a whole. First, the Fiduciary Program assigns 
unsuitable fiduciaries.63 Second, fiduciaries are not always required to 
fulfill the mandatory bond requirement.64 Third, the Program’s staff 
routinely fails to identify abuse.65 
A. The Selection of Inappropriate and Incompetent Fiduciaries 
Investigations,66 hearings,67 and media reports68 have identified 
many instances in which either inadequate or inappropriate 
fiduciaries have been assigned to incompetent beneficiaries. These 
problems manifest themselves in at least three ways. First, 
investigators hire strangers despite the availability of willing and 
qualified family members. Second, unqualified fiduciaries apply for 
positions as paid fiduciaries. Third, technology limits the Program’s 
ability to identify potentially abusive fiduciaries. 
First, the Fiduciary Program inappropriately assigns paid 
strangers to serve as fiduciaries instead of selecting capable family 
members willing to serve for free. For example, Billy Brown, the 
 
 61. Reforming VA’s Flawed Fiduciary System, supra note 17, at 26–27 (statement of Pam 
Estes, Veteran Fiduciary).  
 62. Id. at 60–62 (statement of the Wounded Warrior Project). 
 63. See infra Part II.A. 
 64. See infra Part II.B. 
 65. See infra Part II.C. 
 66. See supra notes 14–18 and accompanying text. 
 67. See supra notes 61–62 and accompanying text. 
 68. E.g., Schwartz, supra note 1; Bill Murphy, Jr., VA Fiduciary Program Comes Under 
Fire, STRIPES CENT. (Apr. 8, 2011), http://www.stripes.com/blogs/stripes-central/stripes-central-
1.8040/va-fiduciary-program-comes-under-fire-1.140500.  
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veteran assigned a cabinet maker as a paid fiduciary, had an adult son 
who already possessed a power of attorney for the veteran and was 
willing to serve as his fiduciary for free.69 In another example, a 
Fiduciary Program employee selected a third party as a fiduciary over 
a retired lieutenant colonel’s daughter who had a valid durable 
financial power of attorney and had managed the veteran’s finances 
for more than ten years.70 
These seemingly absurd results are largely explained by several 
factors. First, in the face of minimal regulatory guidance,71 the Manual 
affords VA employees substantial discretion in selecting a fiduciary. 
It states that the employee assigned to select the fiduciary must 
determine “the type of fiduciary relationship that will best serve the 
needs of the beneficiary.”72 The Manual then lists the various types of 
fiduciaries without creating a hierarchy73 and later, buried in the 
section on commissions, notes that commission should not be 
authorized when another qualified fiduciary is willing to serve 
without pay.74 This substantial discretion leads to questionable results 
in the practice of selecting fiduciaries.75 The Director of Pension and 
Fiduciary Services has told the House Committee on Veterans’ 
Affairs that employees are required to follow an order of preference 
when selecting a fiduciary: (1) the beneficiary’s preference; (2) the 
beneficiary’s spouse, if available; (3) a family member, friend, or 
other individual willing to serve without a fee; and (4) a paid 
 
 69. Schwartz, supra note 1. 
 70. See Solze v. Shinseki, 26 Vet. App. 118, 119 (2013) (per curiam).  
 71. Cf. 38 C.F.R. § 3.850 (2013) (requiring that “[p]ayments of benefits” to incompetent 
beneficiaries be made “to a duly recognized fiduciary . . . when it is determined to be in the best 
interest of the beneficiary”); id. § 13.55 (“The Veterans Service Center Manager is authorized to 
select or appoint . . . the person or legal entity best suited to receive Department of Veterans 
Affairs benefits in a fiduciary capacity for a beneficiary who is . . . incompetent . . . .”); id § 13.58 
(“In absence of special circumstances, the person or legal entity to be appointed legal custodian 
will be the person or legal entity caring for and/or having custody of the beneficiary or the 
beneficiary’s estate.”). 
 72. U.S. DEP’T OF VETERANS AFFAIRS, supra note 2, ch. 2, § E.26.a. 
 73. Id. ch. 2, § E.28. 
 74. Id. ch. 2, § E.29.b. A commission cannot exceed 4 percent of a veteran’s annual VA 
benefits payment. Id. 
 75. See, e.g., Schwartz, supra note 1, at A16 (“Families of veterans like Mr. Brown, 80, and 
William E. Freeman, whose sister was denied the ability to manage his benefits, and 
beneficiaries like Dennis Keyser, whose appointed trustee turned out to be a felon, say the 
system is badly flawed.”); Legion Critiques VA Fiduciary Program, AM. LEGION (Feb. 10, 2012), 
http://www.legion.org/legislative/161404/legion-critiques-va-fiduciary-program (“In one 
example, VA denied the request of one man to be appointed as his father’s fiduciary—although 
he already had power of attorney.”).  
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stranger.76 This requirement, however, is not explicitly provided for in 
the Manual. Additionally, last updated in 2005,77 the current Manual 
does not incorporate any of the modern changes or modifications 
made to the Program. Instead, many changes come in the form of fast 
letters, which override one another to constantly change the rules 
governing the Program.78 
Second, selection is further complicated when unqualified 
fiduciaries apply for positions as paid fiduciaries. Potential fiduciaries’ 
criminal or financial backgrounds may render them unsuitable to 
serve as a financial guardian for vulnerable beneficiaries. For 
example, one report indicates that, despite previously pleading guilty 
to eight counts of tax fraud while working for the Internal Revenue 
Service, a convicted felon was appointed as a paid fiduciary for a 
disabled beneficiary.79 His unlawful selection is likely explained by 
inadequacies in the criminal-background-inquiry process. During the 
selection process, the Manual requires the investigator, by way of a 
criminal background check, to request that the potential fiduciary 
“sign a statement as to whether he or she has been convicted of any 
offense under Federal or State law that resulted in imprisonment for 
more than one year.”80 Nothing in the Manual, however, requires the 
 
 76. Legislative Hearing, supra note 17, at 35 (statement of David McLenachen, Director of 
Pension and Fiduciary Service, U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs); see also U.S. DEP’T OF 
VETERANS AFFAIRS, FEDERAL BENEFITS FOR VETERANS: DEPENDENTS AND SURVIVORS 41 
(2013), available at http://www.va.gov/opa/publications/benefits_book/2013_Federal_
Benefits_for_Veterans_English.pdf (stating that the VA will only consider a paid fiduciary “as a 
last resort”).  
 77. The Fiduciary Manual was last updated in July 2005. See References, Fast Letters and 
Forms, supra note 33. The Compensation and Pension Manual Rewrite, however, in which the 
current Fiduciary Manual was previously published, has been updated as part of the VA’s 
ongoing Rewrite Project, which “focus[es] on rewriting the regulations concerning the 
department’s compensation and pension benefit program.” William L. Pine & William F. Russo, 
Making Veterans’ Benefits Clear: The Regulation Rewrite Project, FED. LAW., July 2010, at 38, 
39; see also M21-1MR Compensation and Pension Manual Rewrite, U.S. DEP’T OF VETERANS 
AFFAIRS, http://www.benefits.va.gov/WARMS/M21_1MR.asp (last visited Feb. 9, 2014). 
 78. See supra note 38.  
 79. Jennifer Kraus, VA Hired Convicted Felon To Manage Veterans’ Money, 
NEWSCHANNEL5.COM (Feb. 21, 2011, 7:21 PM), http://www.newschannel5.com/story/14071970/
va-hires-convicted-felon-to-manage-veterans-money. 
 80. U.S. DEP’T OF VETERANS AFFAIRS, supra note 2, ch. 2, § D.11.g. In contrast, according 
to the Society for Human Resource Management, 93 percent of employers pay for criminal 
background checks from checking companies for some prospective applicants, and 73 percent 
purchase criminal background checks for all potential applicants. PERSIS S. YU & SHARON M. 
DIETRICH, NAT’L CONSUMER LAW CTR., BROKEN RECORDS: HOW ERRORS BY CRIMINAL 
BACKGROUND CHECKING COMPANIES HARM WORKERS AND BUSINESSES 7 (2012), available 
at http://www.nclc.org/images/pdf/pr-reports/broken-records-report.pdf. 
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field examiner to verify the fiduciary’s truthfulness with a neutral 
third party,81 making it fairly easy for the applicant to conceal a 
criminal past. Moreover, because the potential fiduciary is only 
required to report convictions resulting in more than one year of 
imprisonment,82 lesser crimes of financial dishonesty need not be 
reported despite their particular relevance when selecting a fiduciary. 
This is especially troubling considering that many states are 
increasing the threshold dollar amount required to trigger 
imprisonment for financial crimes, such as theft and check kiting, to 
avoid costly prison terms.83 Under the current guidelines, small-time 
fraudsters can honestly complete the background check without 
bringing their past indiscretions to the investigator’s attention. 
Third, technology also limits the Program’s ability to identify 
potentially abusive fiduciaries. The Fiduciary Benefit System (FBS), 
the electronic case-management software intended to facilitate the 
bulk of day-to-day operations in the Fiduciary Program,84 “lacks an 
external interface for fiduciaries, beneficiaries and other external 
entities.”85 As a result, the system cannot process electronically 
submitted accounting information or access financial institutions to 
verify account balances. This system drastically increases the 
potential for error as auditors must manually review the accountings 
for math errors and cross-reference the accountings with data 
separately provided by financial institutions to verify that the 
balances provided are accurate.86 Additionally, FBS does not retain a 
list of fiduciaries replaced due to misuse, making it difficult to track 
fiduciaries to ensure that no new beneficiaries are assigned to them.87  
 
 81. See U.S. DEP’T OF VETERANS AFFAIRS, supra note 2, ch. 2, § D.11 (discussing criminal 
history inquiries and noting no neutral third-party requirement).  
 82. Id. ch. 2, § D.11.h. The Manual states that a criminal background statement can be 
waived “where immediate payment is made to the parent of a minor beneficiary.” Id. ch. 2, 
§ D.11.g. 
 83. Kevin Johnson, Some States Rethink Felony Property Crimes, USA TODAY (Oct. 30, 
2011, 9:55 PM), http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/washington/story/2011-10-30/states-
rethink-felony-property-crimes/51008424/1. 
 84. OFFICE OF AUDITS & EVALUATIONS, supra note 15, at 7–8. 
 85. Id. at 10. 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. at 9.  
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B. Failure To Secure a Surety Bond 
In addition to struggling to select appropriate fiduciaries, the 
Fiduciary Program routinely fails to ensure that estates worth more 
than $20,000 are bonded when appropriate. The Manual explicitly 
requires the Fiduciary Program to consider a corporate surety bond88 
or other method of protection for paid fiduciaries managing estates 
valued in excess of $20,000.89 When the investigator determines a 
surety bond is not required, the Manual requires that the reason for 
deeming this protection unnecessary be documented in a report and 
filed with the beneficiary’s claim.90 Moreover, when a bond is 
required, the Manual places a positive duty on the Fiduciary Program 
investigator to help the fiduciary secure the appropriate bond.91 
Despite these clear requirements, the 2010 audit conducted by 
the VA OIG found that no method of protection (or reason for the 
lack of protection) existed for 86 percent of estates exceeding 
$20,000.92 Additionally, despite a clear requirement that benefit 
payments must be held until a bond or other adequate control is in 
place,93 in one office two investigators authorized the release of 
$571,256 in funds without providing the appropriate protection or a 
documented justification for the lapse.94 Corroborating the VA OIG’s 
findings, the GAO identified at least two cases involving estates 
worth $82,000 and $62,000, respectively, with no documentation of a 
bond or a waiver in the file.95 
There are several explanations for investigators’ routine failure 
to secure a bond. First, investigators and auditors lack experience and 
training. For instance, when asked why they failed to follow the 
Fiduciary Program’s policy regarding bonds, investigators cited 
uncertainty “about what types of bonds are required for certain types 
 
 88. In this context, surety bonds provide a private remedy for beneficiaries harmed by 
fiduciaries’ misuse. James A. Black, Jr., Miscellaneous Surety Bonds and the Restatement, 34 
WM. & MARY L. REV. 1195, 1196 (1993). 
 89. U.S. DEP’T OF VETERANS AFFAIRS, supra note 2, ch. 2, § E.28.i.  
 90. Id. 
 91. Id. If the examiner considers a bond unnecessary, the report must document the 
reason. When a bond is considered necessary, VA payments cannot be made to the fiduciary 
until the bond is in place. Id. 
 92. OFFICE OF AUDITS & EVALUATIONS, supra note 15, at 9. 
 93. U.S. DEP’T OF VETERANS AFFAIRS, supra note 2, ch. 2, § E.28.i.  
 94. OFFICE OF AUDITS & EVALUATIONS, supra note 15, at 10. 
 95. GAO, VA’S FIDUCIARY PROGRAM, supra note 18, at 11–12. 
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of fiduciaries.”96 Investigators and auditors also possess substantial 
discretion. Although the Manual states that investigators must 
consider a surety bond or other method of protection for these high-
value estates, bonds are not required.97 As a result, investigators 
frequently waive the requirement without providing justifications, or 
they authorize the acquisition of inadequate bonds.98 Moreover, the 
Fiduciary Program does not provide a list of approved sureties,99 
requiring only that the bonding authority be recognized in the state of 
jurisdiction.100 This leaves an investigator with substantial discretion to 
select the appropriate surety. 
Technological constraints also play a large role in the Program’s 
inability to track surety bonds. The FBS is painfully out-of-date. The 
Program cannot record surety-bond values or other types of 
accounting information such as benefit amounts, spending, or account 
balances,101 making it nearly impossible for management to keep track 
of which fiduciaries have surety bonds. Additionally, FBS cannot 
interface with other VA programs, including the Veterans Service 
Network (VETSNET),102 requiring staff to manually search for 
impending retroactive disability payments.103 This limitation can result 
in the release of large payments to fiduciaries without the 
establishment of proper safeguards.104 
 
 96. Id. at 12. 
 97. See U.S. DEP’T OF VETERANS AFFAIRS, supra note 2, ch. 2, § E.28.i (indicating that 
investigators may consider “other method[s] of protection” in place of a bond and that, in some 
instances, protection may not be necessary).  
 98. See GAO, VA’S FIDUCIARY PROGRAM, supra note 18, at 11 (“Our nationwide sample 
showed that program staff sometimes failed to obtain proof that a fiduciary purchased a bond, 
when required, or did not adequately document in the beneficiary case files that the bond 
requirement was waived.”); see also OFFICE OF AUDITS & EVALUATIONS, supra note 15, at 9 
(noting that 86 percent of the beneficiary estates exceeding $20,000 lacked withdrawal 
agreements or surety bonds).  
 99. Approved sureties are those who have complied with the law and regulation of the U.S. 
Department of the Treasury (Treasury) and are listed by the Treasury as an authorized bonding 
company. See Surety Companies Doing Business with the United States, 31 C.F.R. § 223.1–223.3 
(2013).   
 100. U.S. DEP’T OF VETERANS AFFAIRS, supra note 2, ch. 3, § E.23.b.  
 101. OFFICE OF AUDITS & EVALUATIONS, supra note 15, at 9. 
 102. VETSNET is the system used to store information about veterans benefits. See 
Veterans Service Network Corporate Mini Master File (VETSNET File), U.S. DEP’T VETERANS 
AFF., http://www.virec.research.va.gov/VETSNET/Overview.htm (last visited Feb. 9, 2014). 
 103. OFFICE OF AUDITS & EVALUATIONS, supra note 15, at 10. 
 104. Id. 
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C. Inability To Identify Misuse 
The biggest problem with the Fiduciary Program, however, is the 
failure to effectively identify abuses. Joe Phillips, for example, 
managed twenty-eight veterans’ accounts for more than twenty-five 
years without receiving even one VA audit, allowing him to steal 
more than $2 million from beneficiaries.105 Similarly, Hazel Diane Hill 
controlled sixteen veterans’ finances under the Fiduciary Program 
and embezzled $62,000 from three of them.106 Unlike Phillips, 
however, no audit caught Hill, who actually turned herself in as a 
result of feelings of guilt.107 
The failure to identify misuse is partially a result of the failure to 
efficiently examine financial reports. Program employees routinely 
struggle to hold fiduciaries responsible for failing to meet financial 
reporting deadlines.108 In fact, Fiduciary Program staff at three of the 
five VAROs surveyed failed to follow up on 63 percent of delinquent 
reports at those three offices.109 In one particularly egregious instance, 
a fiduciary submitted a financial report two years late without 
receiving a reprimand.110 In another case, the VA OIG identified a 
single fiduciary still serving four beneficiaries despite multiple 
allegations of misuse and seriously delinquent accountings for all 
beneficiaries, ranging from 134 to 215 days late.111 Because the 
Fiduciary Program routinely fails to appropriately follow up on 
delinquent financial reports, millions of dollars belonging to 
incompetent veterans are exposed to possible misappropriation.112 
The Fiduciary Program is particularly ineffective at addressing 
allegations of misuse. For example, the VA OIG found that staff 
failed to timely respond to misuse allegations in 96 percent of the 
 
 105. Eric Nalder & Lise Olsen, Investigation: Some Vets’ Money Managed—and Stolen—by 
Scoundrels, HOUS. CHRON., June 17, 2012, at A1. 
 106. Id.  
 107. Id. 
 108. See GAO, VA’S FIDUCIARY PROGRAM, supra note 18, at 10 (showing that in a 
majority of the case files examined, auditors failed to follow up or document the follow-up on 
time). The VA OIG found active fiduciaries with accounts delinquent by up to 710 days. OFFICE 
OF AUDITS & EVALUATIONS, supra note 15, at 3.  
 109. OFFICE OF AUDITS & EVALUATIONS, supra note 15, at 3. 
 110. GAO, VA’S FIDUCIARY PROGRAM, supra note 18, at 11. 
 111. OFFICE OF AUDITS & EVALUATIONS, supra note 15, at 5.  
 112. See id. at 6 (“When VBA fails to take appropriate actions in a timely manner to replace 
fiduciaries that are responsible for multiple delinquent accountings, beneficiary estates are put 
at risk, and the potential for misuse or inappropriate diversion of beneficiary funds is 
increased.”).  
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cases reviewed.113 In one instance, a regional office failed to 
investigate a fiduciary despite allegations from field examiners and a 
third party that the fiduciary may have misused funds.114 When the 
VA does follow up on misuse reports, responses are extremely 
delayed, taking, on average, an extra eighty-one days to complete an 
investigation.115 Once an investigation report is completed, the 
timeliness of the determination decision is spotty; in cases in which 
the VA OIG issued late determinations, the total average time taken 
to complete the determinations was ninety-nine days.116 The extent of 
the delay is especially troubling because the Manual specifies that the 
misuse-response process, which includes both investigation and 
determination, should only take seventy-five days total.117 Because of 
delays among field examiners and auditors, the Fiduciary Program 
takes an average of thirty-two months to catch thieving fiduciaries.118 
These performance delays are partially attributable to unrealistic 
expectations. Despite internal aspirations to meet 90 percent of 
deadlines,119 that delays often occur, sometimes egregiously,120 suggests 
that current performance expectations may be impractical.121 
Unrealistic performance standards distort the priorities of the 
employees, decrease performance quality, and incentivize staff to 
bend standards to meet deadlines.122 Moreover, some investigators 
 
 113. Id. at 6. 
 114. Id. at 7.  
 115. See id. at 6 (noting that the average inspection took 126 days to complete); cf. U.S. 
DEP’T OF VETERANS AFFAIRS, supra note 2, ch. 5, § A.1.e (requiring that investigations occur 
within 45 days of the assignment for investigation). 
 116. OFFICE OF AUDITS & EVALUATIONS, supra note 15, at 6–7. The Manual requires that 
determinations occur within thirty days of the completed investigation. U.S. DEP’T OF 
VETERANS AFFAIRS, supra note 2, ch. 5, § A.1.e. In its case study of misuse allegations, the VA 
OIG found that 25 percent of cases never received a determination, 45 percent of the 
determinations were completed in a timely fashion, and 30 percent of the determinations were 
delayed by four to 175 days beyond the thirty-day requirement. See OFFICE OF AUDITS & 
EVALUATIONS, supra note 15, at 6–7. 
 117. U.S. DEP’T OF VETERANS AFFAIRS, supra note 2, ch. 5, § A.1.e. 
 118. Nalder & Olsen, supra note 105. 
 119. GAO, VA’S FIDUCIARY PROGRAM, supra note 18, at 12. 
 120. See supra notes 109–18 and accompanying text. 
 121. Cf. Examining the Fiduciary Program, supra note 17, at 22–23 (statement of Katherine 
R. Pflanz, Field Examiner, Winston-Salem Veterans Affairs Regional Office) (discussing 
problems with performance measures in other programs under the VBA). 
 122. Cf. CNA ANALYSIS & SOLUTIONS, QUALITATIVE ANALYSIS OF VBA EMPLOYEE 
WORK CREDIT AND WORK MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS 30−31 (2009), available at 
http://www.veteranslawlibrary.com/files/Commission_Reports/CNA_work_credit_analysis_Nov
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and auditors travel long distances to hold in-person interviews with 
beneficiaries and fiduciaries, making it onerous to conduct timely 
visits.123 
Outdated technology also shares some of the blame for the 
Program’s failure to follow up on delinquent financial reports and 
address misuse allegations. The FBS substantially limits the daily 
functions of the Fiduciary Program, as the software accepts only one 
due date for a financial report (thereby overriding older due dates 
when a report has not been submitted), provides no means of 
comparing monthly or yearly budgets to actual expenditures, and 
cannot accept or process electronically submitted documents.124 FBS 
data field limitations also prevent staff from recording all pertinent 
information regarding beneficiaries or fiduciaries within the 
software.125 To compensate, staff manually track such dates using 
personal notes to remind themselves of pending actions,126 which 
inevitably creates inefficiencies and substantial room for error. 
The FBS also makes it difficult for management to monitor 
employees. The software does not generate a single management 
report showing staff deadlines.127 Instead, managers must physically 
cross-reference several reports to determine monthly deadlines, a 
task requiring considerable time and experience.128 The FBS also 
provides no efficient means of monitoring staff performance because 
the Program only stores two months of production data: the current 
month and the previous month.129 As a result, to analyze a particular 
employee’s performance, managers must manually evaluate the 
individual’s performance for each month under review and then 
compare those to an employee’s overall performance,130 an extremely 
taxing analysis. 
 
2009.pdf (noting that unrealistic performance expectations are present in the VBA more 
generally). 
 123. Examining the Fiduciary Program, supra note 17, at 51 (statement of Daniel Bertoni, 
Director, Education, Workforce, and Income Security, U.S. Government Accountability 
Office). 
 124. See GAO, VA’S FIDUCIARY PROGRAM, supra note 18, at 14–15. This forces fiduciaries 
to submit their annual reports by mail. OFFICE OF AUDITS & EVALUATIONS, supra note 15, at 
10. 
 125. GAO, VA’S FIDUCIARY PROGRAM, supra note 18, at 14–15.  
 126. Id. at 15. 
 127. Id. at 16. 
 128. See id. (describing the process as one “which can be cumbersome”). 
 129. OFFICE OF AUDITS & EVALUATIONS, supra note 15, at 21–22. 
 130. GAO, VA’S FIDUCIARY PROGRAM, supra note 18, at 16. 
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III.  BEYOND TRADITIONAL REFORM: THE PROBLEMS WITH 
COMPREHENSIVE STATUTORY REFORM 
Despite numerous reports indicating that the Fiduciary Program 
needs substantial reform, successful reform has not yet occurred. 
Critics of an agency’s performance might turn to the legislative or 
judicial branch for relief.131 Congressional adoption of a more explicit 
statutory scheme to regulate the Fiduciary Program would likely 
encounter hurdles to effective, meaningful judicial review. To explain, 
this Note first examines why a new statutory scheme would be 
insufficient to fix the Fiduciary Program and then second explores 
why, even if an amended statute were passed, the limitations on 
judicial review would render the new statute ineffective. 
A. The Inadequacies of a Purely Legislative Solution 
Congress can reign in agency action by using several techniques, 
including oversight hearings to increase public pressure and, when 
appropriate, the adoption of new statutes crystallizing congressional 
expectations.132 Oversight hearings in this context, however, have 
made little progress in reforming the Fiduciary Program,133 prompting 
veterans’ advocates to lobby for a new statute. This proposed reform, 
despite identifying and attempting to rectify many of the current 
problems, will not fix the Fiduciary Program. 
After years of encouraging reform and achieving little progress, 
several representatives proposed legislation overhauling the Fiduciary 
Program.134 A proposed bill, known as the Veterans Fiduciary Reform 
Act of 2012,135 stalled in the Senate, but a nearly identical version was 
revived in the House in 2013.136 H.R. 894 aims to improve accounting 
practices and increase transparency in the system.137 It addresses many 
 
 131. Some authors disfavor external review of agency decisionmaking altogether. See 
Richard J. Pierce & Sidney A. Shapiro, Political and Judicial Review of Agency Action, 59 TEX. 
L. REV. 1175, 1178 (1981) (arguing that “[a]gencies should be scrutinized only to determine 
whether the benefit of the administrative program outweighs whatever costs—including those of 
capricious action—may be imposed by the inevitable play in the regulatory process”).  
 132. Edward J. Markey, Congress to Administrative Agencies: Creator, Overseer, and 
Partner, 1990 DUKE L.J. 967, 971.  
 133. See supra notes 15−19 and accompanying text. 
 134. H.R. REP. NO. 112-678, at 14 (2012). 
 135. H.R. 5948, 112th Cong. (2012).  
 136. H.R. 894, 113th Cong. (2013).  
 137. See Press Release, House Comm. on Veterans’ Affairs, Miller, Johnson, Roe Introduce 
VA Fiduciary Reform Act of 2012 (June 19, 2012), available at http://veterans.house.gov/press-
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of the procedural and discretionary flaws in the Fiduciary Program. 
H.R. 894 reduces staff discretion by giving the beneficiary more 
authority to designate or remove a fiduciary, makes in-person 
interviews and background checks mandatory, and codifies the 
previously discretionary preference for appointing a fiduciary 
designated by a beneficiary.138 It also standardizes annual accounting 
reports;139 requires fiduciaries to annually report any criminal 
convictions, bankruptcy filings, or legal judgments acquired during 
the previous year; and requires the Fiduciary Program to transmit the 
fiduciary’s annual financial report to the beneficiary and any legal 
guardian.140 In an effort to improve monitoring, H.R. 894 requires 
each regional office to maintain a list of fiduciaries along with their 
personal information, a requirement designed to promote 
cooperation among regional offices.141 
Despite proposing essential reforms, H.R. 894 is unlikely to fix 
the Fiduciary Program’s flaws. First, there is the practical issue of 
political will. Despite almost universal recognition that the Fiduciary 
Program needs reform,142 the Veterans Fiduciary Reform Act stalled 
in the Senate without ever reaching the floor for debate.143 H.R. 894 
has failed to garner even a full vote of the House Committee on 
Veterans’ Affairs.144 This stagnation emphasizes the limitations of 
congressional action as an effective means to reform administrative 
agencies. Beyond this practical limitation, there is the larger issue of 
prioritization. The veterans community has limited lobbying 
resources, and many of those resources are focused elsewhere. For 
example, the high suicide rate among disabled veterans145 and the 
 
release/miller-johnson-roe-introduce-va-fiduciary-reform-act-of-2012 (stating the aims of the 
2012 act).  
 138. H.R. 894, 113th Cong. § 1.  
 139. See id. (proposing certain requirements for inclusion in annual financial reports in 
§ 5509(c)).  
 140. Id. 
 141. Id. 
 142. See supra Parts II.A–C. 
 143. See supra note 20.   
 144. See supra note 22. 
 145. See Michelle Castillo, Study: Suicide Rates Among Army Soldiers Up 80 Percent, CBS 
NEWS (July 10, 2012), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/study-suicide-rates-among-army-soldiers-
up-80-percent. 
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massive delays associated with processing VA disability claims146 
arguably make reform of other VA programs a higher priority for 
advocates than reform of the Fiduciary Program. This state of affairs 
reveals the other practical danger inherent in relying on Congress to 
reform the Program: external support is necessary to motivate 
political change.147 
But even if sufficient political will existed to pass the proposed 
legislation, the Fiduciary Program’s struggles to comply with its 
statutory mandate would continue. First, the legislation is too 
ambiguous. For example, the Fiduciary Program would still authorize 
the Secretary of Veterans Affairs to obtain a fiduciary “in the best 
interests of a beneficiary” without defining that phrase,148 
perpetuating the previously discussed problems related to excessive 
discretion.149 Similarly, although the proposed statute does explicitly 
prefer the beneficiary’s selected fiduciary, the statute still leaves the 
ultimate determination to the VA.150 Political pressure forces 
Congress to use very general enabling language in legislation 
regulating administrative bodies.151 This language, in turn, makes it 
extremely difficult to bind administrative employees, creating 
logistical difficulties regarding noncompliance.152 
Second, the proposed legislation does not address the Fiduciary 
Program’s underlying problem with employee compliance. As 
discussed above, employees are ignoring Program policy at every 
stage. During the selection process, investigators frequently disregard 
the bonding requirement and the preference for family-member 
fiduciaries.153 At the monitoring stage, auditors miss deadlines by 
 
 146. Steve Vogel, Veterans Face Another Backlog as a Quarter-Million Appeal Disability 
Claims, WASH. POST (Sept. 8, 2013, 7:52 PM), http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2013-09-
10/politics/41934907_1_veterans-claims-va-secretary-eric-k-veterans-affairs. 
 147. See Michael D. Sant’Ambrogio, Agency Delays: How a Principal-Agent Approach Can 
Inform Judicial and Executive Branch Review of Agency Foot-Dragging, 79 GEO. WASH. L. 
REV. 1381, 1418 (2011) (“Although individual members of Congress frequently write to 
agencies on their constituents’ behalf, only when delays begin to affect large numbers of 
intended beneficiaries of politically popular programs will Congress begin to hold hearings and 
consider imposing statutory deadlines.”). 
 148. See H.R. 894, 113th Cong. § 1 (2013).  
 149. See supra notes 71–78 and accompanying text. 
 150. See H.R. 894, 113th Cong. § 1 (listing potential fiduciary appointees and directing the 
Secretary to select one of the listed options “to the extent possible”).  
 151. Pierce & Shapiro, supra note 131, at 1197.  
 152. For further discussion of the difficulties associated with discretionary language, see 
infra notes 196–202 and accompanying text.  
 153. See supra Parts II.A–B. 
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weeks and routinely fail to follow documentation requirements.154 
Agency effectiveness in tackling misuse is even more startling: in 2011 
fiduciary personnel conducted only 561 misuse investigations, and 
only twenty-five cases (representing less than 5 percent) resulted in 
the removal of the fiduciary.155 Lower-level employees are not the 
only ones bypassing accountability mechanisms. At the highest level, 
leadership within the VA has ignored the legal controls designed to 
provide accountability. For example, despite an explicit requirement 
that the Fiduciary Program’s central office report misuse to Congress 
in an Annual Benefits report,156 the central office failed to report 
misuse activities in every year from fiscal year 2005 to fiscal year 
2008.157 In this light, changes to the text of the statutes authorizing the 
Fiduciary Program fail to address this underlying compliance 
problem. 
Third, legislative efforts to reduce employee discretion might 
exacerbate, not remedy, issues regarding noncompliance. A certain 
amount of discretion is critical for agencies to function effectively.158 
Considering the complexity of the decisions being made, the 
importance of the intangible information gained through personal 
visits, and the effect of a determination on the well-being of the 
individual beneficiary, some amount of discretion is inevitable and 
even preferable. As such, rather than tempering discretion, reform 
should focus on establishing effective monitoring by internal and 
external actors to ensure accountability.159 
B. Judicial Review: Not a Realistic Reform Tool 
Practically speaking, there is little hope that judicial review will 
improve the selection or dismissal of fiduciaries. First, Congress 
narrowly limits judicial review of fiduciary selection and dismissal to a 
single, overwhelmed court for preliminary review. Second, the 
 
 154. See supra Part II.C. 
 155. VETERANS BENEFITS ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF VETERANS AFFAIRS, ANNUAL 
BENEFITS REPORT: FISCAL YEAR 2011, at 35 (2012), available at http://www.vba.va.gov/
REPORTS/abr/2011_abr.pdf.  
 156. 38 U.S.C. §§ 5510(5)–(9) (2006 & Supp. V 2011). 
 157. OFFICE OF AUDITS & EVALUATIONS, supra note 15, at 8.  
 158. See Pierce & Shapiro, supra note 131, at 1178 (arguing “that a certain amount of 
discretion is necessary if agencies are to function effectively in a complex society”). 
 159. Cf. id. at 1180 (“Although an effective regulatory process requires that agencies be 
given considerable freedom, the presence of wide administrative discretion increases the 
importance of democratic controls over the entire process.”).  
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requirements of administrative law funnel all cases through a lengthy 
judicial process, forcing beneficiaries to endure years of financial 
management by unwanted and potentially abusive fiduciaries. 
1. Only One Federal Court Has Jurisdiction To Hear VA-Related 
Claims.  The Veterans’ Judicial Review Act (VJRA)160 creates a very 
specific pipeline for judicial review of claims related to the Fiduciary 
Program. Dissatisfied beneficiaries must first appeal the decision to 
the Board of Veterans’ Appeals (BVA)161 and then to the CAVC, an 
Article I court composed of nine judges appointed for fifteen-year 
terms162 with exclusive jurisdiction over decisions made by the BVA.163 
After exhausting both forums, the dissatisfied veteran may then turn 
to the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which can decide 
only “relevant questions of law, including interpreting constitutional 
and statutory provisions,”164 and then by certiorari to the U.S. 
Supreme Court.165 
There are several problems with this form of judicial review. 
First, although Congress intended the CAVC to exist independently 
of the VA,166 the court frequently serves as a rubber stamp for VA 
procedures in practice. The court often remands cases back to the 
BVA for further review without reprimand, even in the face of clear 
evidentiary or procedural issues.167 For example, consider the case of 
Allen and Darren Crenshaw. In February 2012, Darren Crenshaw 
 
 160. Veterans’ Judicial Review Act, Pub. L. No. 100-687, 102 Stat. 4105 (1988) (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of 38 U.S.C.). 
 161. See 38 U.S.C. § 7104(a) (2006) (subjecting the Secretary’s decisions “to one review on 
appeal to the Secretary,” with “[f]inal decisions on such appeals [to] be made by the Board”). 
 162. See 38 U.S.C. §§ 7253(a)–(c) (indicating the name of the court, the number of members, 
the length of their terms, and noting that judges are to be appointed by the President with the 
advice and consent of the Senate). Although the court traditionally has seven judges, two 
additional judges were authorized in 2008 as part of a temporary expansion provision. Veterans 
Benefits Improvement Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-389, § 601, 122 Stat. 4145, 4176–77 (codified 
at 38 U.S.C. § 7253 (2006 & Supp. V 2011)). 
 163. 38 U.S.C. § 7252(a). The exclusive jurisdiction explicitly includes constitutional 
questions. Id. § 7261(a)(1). 
 164. Id. §§ 7292(a), (c)–(d); see also Chinnock v. Turnage, 995 F.2d 889, 892 (9th Cir. 1993) 
(holding that the Ninth Circuit was without jurisdiction to review a VA interpretation of 
regulations governing veterans’ “service-connected” disabilities). 
 165. 38 U.S.C. § 7291.  
 166. H.R. REP. No. 100-963, at 26 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5782, 5808.  
 167. See James T. O’Reilly, Burying Caesar: Replacement of the Veterans Appeals Process Is 
Needed To Provide Fairness to Claimants, 53 ADMIN. L. REV. 223, 232–33 (2001) (describing a 
pattern of remand without consequence by the CAVC in the face of meaningful error by the 
VA).  
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was deemed incompetent and in need of a fiduciary.168 In response, 
Allen Crenshaw, Darren’s father and caretaker, sent six letters 
requesting his appointment as Darren’s fiduciary, none of which 
received a response from the VA.169 In November 2012, the 
Crenshaws, no doubt frustrated with the lack of progress, filed a 
petition for a writ of mandamus to the CAVC asking the court to 
direct the Secretary of Veterans Affairs to appoint Allen Crenshaw as 
Darren’s fiduciary.170 In response to the petition, the Secretary 
introduced a letter stating that a paid fiduciary had been appointed, 
though nothing indicated that the letter had ever been sent to the 
Crenshaws.171 Despite the Fiduciary Program’s disorganization and 
untimeliness, the CAVC explicitly refused to take a position on 
whether the VA properly appointed a fiduciary and instead 
concluded that the Crenshaws had been afforded sufficient relief 
because they had the opportunity to appeal the matter to the BVA.172 
Though the court has raised concerns in the past that the Fiduciary 
Program may be incapable of “thoroughly and impartially 
investigat[ing] misuse allegations raised by incompetent veterans,” 
the CAVC has decided it is “procedurally and jurisdictionally 
precluded” from reviewing petitions for mandamus related to 
challenging misuse allegations,173 leaving beneficiaries with few 
mechanisms to effectively challenge the selection or dismissal of a 
fiduciary.174 
Second, because the CAVC rarely uses the writ of mandamus to 
bypass the BVA,175 beneficiaries must endure the grueling wait 
 
 168. Crenshaw v. Shinseki, No. 12-3419, 2013 WL 846700, at *1 (Vet. App. Mar. 7, 2013). 
 169. Id. 
 170. Id. 
 171. Id. 
 172. Id. at *2. 
 173. Mimms v. Shinseki, No. 12-2651, 2013 WL 2629248, at *12 (Vet. App. June 12, 2013). 
 174. Although Freeman v. Shinseki, 24 Vet. App. 404 (2011) (per curiam), is an exception to 
this general rule, the CAVC’s language in Mimms reflects a strong preference for rarely using 
“the ‘drastic’ remedy of a writ of mandamus.” Mimms, 2013 WL 2629248, at *12. As discussed 
above, the CAVC is the only avenue of meaningful appellate review for veterans. See supra 
notes 161–65 and accompanying text. 
 175. See, e.g., Dickson v. West, No. 99-2128, 2000 WL 649170, at *1 (Vet. App. Mar. 21, 
2000) (declining to issue a writ of mandamus in a case alleging delay in the appointment of a 
replacement fiduciary); Brower v. Nicholson, No. 05-1253, 2005 WL 2105418, at *1 (Vet. App. 
July 19, 2005) (declining to issue a writ of mandamus, concluding, instead, that it did not have 
authority to review the Secretary’s appointment of a fiduciary); cf., e.g., Willis v. Brown, 6 Vet. 
App. 433, 434 (1994) (concluding that the CAVC did not have authority to review the 
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associated with filing an initial claim before the BVA. Each year, the 
BVA, composed of only sixty-four judges,176 confronts an enormous 
volume of cases.177 Because the overloaded BVA plays a critical part 
in the appeals process, resolution of any VA claims takes an 
incredibly long time. According to the most recent VA figures, a 
veteran who appeals to the BVA can expect to wait an average of 
1,598 days, with an additional 321 days tacked on if the claim is 
appealed to the CAVC.178 In contrast, according to disability 
practitioners, it takes 530 days on average to appeal a decision of the 
Social Security Administration (SSA) to an administrative-law judge 
and an additional 270 days to appeal that determination to the Social 
Security Appeals Council.179 By routing fiduciary selection and 
removal issues through this type of lengthy process,180 beneficiaries 
must wait years to give control over their financial assets to their 
preferred fiduciaries. 
Third, fiduciaries cannot even hire lawyers to defend their rights 
until the case has been appealed. Federal law prohibits veterans from 
hiring attorneys prior to the filing of the notice of disagreement,181 the 
document that initiates the appeal.182 Moreover, any fees paid to an 
 
Secretary’s appointment of a fiduciary). But see Freeman v. Shinseki, 24 Vet. App. 404 (2011) 
(per curiam). 
 176. BD. OF VETERANS’ APPEALS, U.S. DEP’T OF VETERANS AFFAIRS, REPORT OF THE 
CHAIRMAN: FISCAL YEAR 2012, at 3, available at http://www.bva.va.gov/docs/Chairmans_
Annual_Rpts/BVA2012AR.pdf. In contrast, there are more than sixteen hundred 
administrative-law judges. ASS’N ADMIN. L. JUDGES, http://www.aalj.org (last visited Feb. 9, 
2014). 
 177. Petitioners filed 45,959 cases in fiscal year 2012. The most recent BVA estimates 
project that appealed cases could increase to 54,033 in 2013 and 64,941 in 2014. BD. OF 
VETERANS’ APPEALS, supra note 176, at 16, 20.  
 178. Vogel, supra note 146. These wait times are expected to increase as resources are 
shifted away from resolving appeals to addressing the backlog related to disability claims. Id. 
 179. The Social Security Disability Appeals Process, MARC WHITEHEAD & ASSOCS., 
http://www.disabilitydenials.com/social-security-disability-appeals-process (last visited Feb. 9, 
2014). 
 180. The exclusive jurisdiction of the CAVC may also extend to suits for negligence against 
the VA. See Lujan v. Sec’y of Veterans Affairs, No. 2:09CV56, 2009 WL 2920341, at *2 (D. Utah 
Sept. 11, 2009) (holding that claims under 38 U.S.C. § 6107 fall within the exclusivity of the 
VJRA). For further discussion of the negligence cause of action against the VA, see supra notes 
59–60 and accompanying text. 
 181. 38 U.S.C. § 5904(c)(1) (2006) (“[A] fee may not be charged, allowed, or paid for 
services of agents and attorneys with respect to services provided before the date on which a 
notice of disagreement is filed with respect to the case.”).  
 182. The notice of disagreement is discussed in further detail in the VA Adjudication 
Procedures Manual Rewrite. See generally U.S. DEP’T OF VETERANS AFFAIRS, M21-1MR, 
BOSWORTH IN PP (FLIP) (DO NOT DELETE) 3/16/2014  8:21 PM 
2014] COMBATING PRIVATIZATION 1529 
attorney during the appellate process must be approved by the VA.183 
Although the Supreme Court has found the fee limitation 
constitutional,184 the practical effect of this law is to deny attorneys the 
opportunity to preserve the appellate record or counsel veteran 
clients prior to filing the complaint, leaving veterans to navigate an 
extremely complicated legal system either pro se or based on the 
generosity of lawyers.185 This is especially troubling when the VA 
attempts to use complicated jurisdictional arguments to deny 
beneficiaries a forum to challenge the selection of a fiduciary. In 
Freeman v. Shinseki,186 the legal counsel for the VA argued that the 
CAVC did not have jurisdiction to review decisions related to the 
appointment of a veteran’s fiduciary.187 Yet the court noted that the 
VA legal counsel had previously won motions to dismiss in cases in 
which a beneficiary challenged the selection of a fiduciary in federal 
courts by arguing that only the CAVC had jurisdiction over these 
cases.188 By playing both sides of the field, the VA functionally denied 
beneficiaries any opportunity to appeal the selection of the person 
designated to manage his financial resources. Although Freeman v. 
Shinseki resolved this jurisdictional issue by finally giving the 
beneficiary the right to appeal the appointment of a fiduciary,189 the 
willingness of the VA to use jurisdictional arguments to avoid judicial 
 
COMPENSATION AND PENSION MANUAL REWRITE, pt. I, ch. 5, § B, available at 
http://www.benefits.va.gov/WARMS/docs/admin21/m21_1/mr/part1/M21-1MRI_5_SecB.doc. 
 183. 38 U.S.C. §§ 5904(c)(2)–(3). To receive fees, an attorney must file an application under 
the Equal Access to Justice Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2412(d)(1)–(2) (2012), proving that the attorney 
(1) is a prevailing party; (2) has a net worth less than $2,000,000; and (3) provided an itemized 
statement of the attorney fees and expenses sought. The attorney must also prove that the 
Secretary’s position was not substantially justified. Id.; see also Wilbon v. Shinseki, No. 11-
1908(E), 2012 WL 1058939, at *2 (Vet. App. Mar. 30, 2012) (denying attorneys’ fees because the 
petitioner was not a prevailing party when the agency changed its petition in favor of the 
veteran while the petition for writ of mandamus was pending).  
 184. See Walters v. Nat’l Ass’n of Radiation Survivors, 473 U.S. 305, 326 (1985) (“It would 
take an extraordinarily strong showing of probability of error under the present system—and 
the probability that the presence of attorneys would sharply diminish that possibility—to 
warrant a holding that the fee limitation denies claimants due process of law. . . . [N]o such 
showing was made out on the record before the District Court.”).  
 185. See Benjamin W. Wright, It’s All About the Money: Denying Disabled Veterans the 
Right to an Attorney, 6 NAELA J. 203, 211 (2010). 
 186. Freeman v. Shinseki, 24 Vet. App. 404 (2011) (per curiam).  
 187. Id. at 408. 
 188. Id. at 407 (citing Judkins v. Veterans Admin., 415 F. Supp. 2d 613, 617–18 (E.D.N.C. 
2005); Carney v. G.I. Jane, No. Civ. A. B-03-173, 2005 WL 2277490, at *2 (S.D. Tex. Sept. 16, 
2005); Whitmire v. U.S. Veterans Admin., 661 F. Supp. 720, 722 (W.D. Wash. 1986)). 
 189. Freeman, 24 Vet. App. at 416–17. 
BOSWORTH IN PP (FLIP) (DO NOT DELETE) 3/16/2014  8:21 PM 
1530 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 63:1503 
review of the Fiduciary Program undermines the working assumption 
that the VA always protects the interest of veterans. 
2. Administrative Law Bars Judicial Review.  In addition to a 
limited and narrowly construed forum for judicial review, several 
principles of administrative law bar the CAVC from reviewing the 
decisions of the Fiduciary Program on the merits in a timely 
manner.190 
First, the CAVC can rely on the doctrine of administrative 
exhaustion to refrain from reviewing challenges to the selection of 
fiduciaries when the arguments were not previously raised. The 
doctrine of exhaustion prohibits an appeal based on certain 
challenges and arguments when “the appellant has failed to present 
those challenges and arguments, either expressly or implicitly, to the 
Board.”191 Despite the Federal Circuit’s determination that the BVA 
must read all filings liberally whether or not the veteran is 
represented by counsel,192 the CAVC often invokes the exhaustion 
doctrine to refuse to entertain newly raised arguments.193 
The finality requirement imposes an alternative bar against 
raising challenges to the Fiduciary Program’s selection or removal of 
a fiduciary. To obtain review by the CAVC, the BVA must issue a 
final decision following the notice of disagreement.194 As a result, the 
CAVC routinely denies petitions for extraordinary relief that 
challenge the selection or removal of a fiduciary on the basis that the 
BVA has not yet issued a final decision on the status of the 
fiduciary.195 These denials force petitioners back into the queue where 
they must wait for several years while a stranger manages their 
money. 
 
 190. The Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. §§ 551–559, 701–706 (2012), 
applies to the Veterans Administration. See Castellano v. Shinseki, 25 Vet. App. 146, 150 
(2011). 
 191. Van Alstine v. Principi, No. 99-1322, 2002 WL 31757849, at *4 (Vet. App. July 26, 2002) 
(quoting Stuckey v. West, 13 Vet. App. 163, 174 (1999), withdrawn Stuckey v. Principi, No. 96-
1373 (Vet. App. Jan. 24, 2001)). For a more comprehensive discussion of issue exhaustion, see 
generally Gary E. O’Connor, Did Decide or Should Have Decided: Issue Exhaustion and the 
Veterans Benefits Appeals Process, 49 AM. U. L. REV. 1279 (2000). 
 192. Robinson v. Shinseki, 557 F.3d 1355, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 
 193. E.g., Owens v. Shinseki, No. 12-1626, 2013 WL 3283492, at *6 (Vet. App. June 28, 
2013); Gibbons v. Shinseki, No. 11-2662, 2012 WL 6651974, at * 7 (Vet. App. Dec. 21, 2012).  
 194. 38 U.S.C. § 7266(a) (2006). 
 195. E.g., Evans v. Shinseki, No. 12-1023, 2012 WL 1560379, at *2–3 (Vet. App. May 4, 
2012).  
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Finally, considering the substantial flexibility afforded to 
investigators and auditors by the Manual, the standards used to 
review large portions of the Program remain unclear. For example, 
take the VA policies regarding the appointment of fiduciaries: 
Federal law allows the Secretary of Veterans Affairs to pay benefits 
to a fiduciary “[w]here it appears to the Secretary that the interest of 
the beneficiary would be served.”196 This discretion is carried over into 
the regulations and guidelines, which encourage the investigator to 
focus on the “best interest of the beneficiary” in appointing a 
fiduciary.197 And the Manual indicates that VA employees should 
determine “the type of fiduciary relationship that will best serve the 
needs of the beneficiary,” a determination that employees might 
make by reference to a VA policy prioritizing (1) the beneficiary’s 
preference; (2) the beneficiary’s spouse, if available; (3) a family 
member, friend, or other individual willing to serve without a fee; and 
(4) a paid stranger.198 
In this example, even assuming that Program determinations 
such as those about the “best interest of the beneficiary” in 
appointing a fiduciary are reviewable,199 the CAVC has yet to 
determine how it will treat such discretionary portions of the Manual 
and implementing directives. There is precedent suggesting that some 
portions of the Manual sufficiently restrict VA discretion to be 
considered legislative rules that substantively bind the VA.200 
Additionally, the CAVC has previously held that “the mere existence 
of some discretion is not sufficient . . . for a rule to be classified as a 
general statement of policy” or an interpretative rule.201 These 
distinctions would most likely affect the level of deference courts 
 
 196. 38 U.S.C. § 5502(a)(1).  
 197. See supra note 47. For other regulatory constraints on the selection of a fiduciary, see 
supra note 71. 
 198. See supra notes 73–76 and accompanying text. 
 199. The CAVC has determined that the Program’s statutory and regulatory standards are 
sufficient to permit judicial review of the selections of fiduciaries. Freeman v. Shinseki, 24 Vet. 
App. 404, 411, 413–14 (2011) (per curiam). 
 200. See Fugere v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 103, 106–07 (1990) (considering an earlier version 
of the Compensation and Pension Manual Rewrite and reaching this conclusion); see also 
Morton v. West, 13 Vet. App. 205, 206–07 (1999) (relying on substantive rules in the 
Compensation and Pension Manual related to the VA duty to assist); cf. Buzinski v. Brown, 6 
Vet. App. 360, 69 (1994) (noting that VA directives are binding only to the extent they 
“prescribe substantive rules—not interpretive rules” (quotation marks omitted)). 
 201. Morton, 13 Vet. App. 208–09 (quoting Guardian Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Fed. Sav. & 
Loan Ins. Corp., 589 F.2d 658, 667 (D.C. Cir. 1978)). 
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would afford the agency in evaluating whether employees complied 
with the standard.202 
Judicial challenge may very well remain open to plaintiff-
beneficiaries. For instance, if a court were to hold that portions of the 
Manual, fast letters, or other subregulatory directives203 were binding 
legislative rules, rather than general statements of policy or 
interpretative rules, it could raise questions about whether they need 
to go through the process of notice and comment.204 Similarly, 
although plaintiffs have (so far unsuccessfully) challenged the VA’s 
fiduciary-appointment procedures on due process grounds, at least 
one court remains open to considering this potential argument.205 
These issues, in conjunction with the significant procedural hurdles 
discussed above, will most likely play a substantial role in future 
litigation by plaintiff-beneficiaries.206 
IV.  THE SOLUTION: INTERNAL REFORM AND EXTERNAL 
ACCOUNTABILITY 
As neither adopting a new statute nor litigating the application 
of the Fiduciary Program in the current judicial system will provide 
relief, this Note advocates turning to other mechanisms for reform. 
This Note recommends two reforms: (1) the Fiduciary Program 
 
 202. When reviewed by a court, legislative rules will get Chevron deference, whereas 
interpretive rules will get Skidmore deference. Jamie A. Yavelberg, The Revival of Skidmore v. 
Swift: Judicial Deference to Agency Interpretations After EEOC v. ARAMCO, 42 DUKE L.J. 
166, 174–75 (1992). Despite this precedent, the CAVC has not yet determined whether the 
discretionary portions of the Manual are legislative or interpretive. For more information on 
interpretative rules, see generally Thomas J. Fraser, Interpretive Rules: Can the Amount of 
Deference Accorded Them Offer Insight into the Procedural Inquiry?, 90 B.U. L. REV. 1303 
(2010). 
 203. For discussion of these subregulatory directives, see supra notes 33–40 and 
accompanying text. 
 204. Cf. Am. Mining Cong. v. Mine Safety & Health Admin., 995 F.2d 1106, 1112–13 (D.C. 
Cir. 1993) (holding that the APA requires that legislative rules be submitted for comment and 
distinguishing between legislative and interpretive rules). To the extent these subregulatory 
directives in fact cabin agency discretion, they would seem to clash with 38 C.F.R. § 19.5, which 
indicates that “the Board [of Veterans’ Appeals] . . . is not bound by Department manuals, 
circulars, or similar administrative issues.” 38 C.F.R. § 19.5 (2013); cf. Am. Mining Cong., 955 
F.2d at 1112 (noting that a rule is not interpretive to the extent it “repudiates or is irreconcilable 
with an existing legislative rule”). 
 205. See Solze v. Shinseki, No. 12,1512, 2012 WL 4801411, at *6 (Vet. App. Oct. 10, 2012) 
(ordering the Secretary of Veterans Affairs “to show cause as to why the Court should not 
determine that his actions violated [the plaintiff]’s right to due process under the Fifth 
Amendment”); infra note 216. 
 206. See supra notes 181–89 and accompanying text. 
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should make specific changes intended to address internal problems, 
and (2) the Fiduciary Program should rely on third parties to provide 
independent monitoring that will ensure compliance with Program 
regulations. 
A. Internal Reform 
Some of the most important changes to the Fiduciary Program 
must be tackled internally. The Program can make significant 
progress by improving its management structure and taking steps to 
provide staff with key resources. Such changes would go a long way 
toward improving policy compliance and efficiency. By identifying 
these issues and proposing reasonable modifications to address 
particular problems, this Note aims to make reform a tangible 
possibility. 
1. National Standards.  The Fiduciary Program should develop 
national performance standards to ensure consistent performance 
across regional offices. According to the VA OIG, regional offices 
performed substantially better at securing delinquent accountings 
when management consistently conducted local quality reviews, 
reviewed available management reports, and assisted employees with 
case.207 Moreover, whereas some regional offices failed to verify 
questionable expenses in 47 percent of their case reviews, other 
regional offices produced zero errors.208 This huge performance gap 
suggests that the Fiduciary Program is working effectively in at least 
some of the regional offices and that those with high error rates could 
benefit from emulating the processes adopted by these successful 
offices. By implementing the techniques employed by successful 
regional offices at a national level, the Fiduciary Program could 
improve across-the-board performance. 
Effective national standards also require accurate performance 
measures. As the business world has long recognized, “What you 
measure is what you get”209—quality performance measures are the 
key to superior staff performance. As such, the Fiduciary Program 
needs to synchronize performance measures with the Program’s 
objectives. For example, despite the importance of investigating 
 
 207. See OFFICE OF AUDITS & EVALUATIONS, supra note 15, at 3–4. 
 208. Id. at 4.  
 209. Robert S. Kaplan & David P. Norton, The Balanced Scorecard—Measures That Drive 
Performance, HARVARD BUS. REV., Jan.−Feb. 1992, at 71, 71. 
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misuse allegations, the Fiduciary Program currently does not hold 
staff responsible for the timely and thorough processing of misuse 
allegations.210 Changing performance standards to evaluate individual 
employee follow-up on misuse allegations would incentivize 
timeliness and would encourage management to identify 
noncompliant employees, thereby improving the likelihood that staff 
will observe internal policies.211 
Those performance standards already in existence should be 
reviewed for effectiveness. By making performance expectations 
more accurate, the Fiduciary Program would ensure that employees 
select qualified fiduciaries and would promote more effective 
monitoring. In addition to improving performance quality, reforming 
expectations may decrease the strain on staff associated with 
unrealistic deadlines,212 thereby reducing the likelihood of burnout by 
qualified examiners and auditors in the Fiduciary Program. 
Regularly updated guidelines would also aid in the development 
of realistic national standards. Because other parts of the VA have 
already adopted updated and clear regulations,213 the Fiduciary 
Program would be unlikely to face substantial resistance should it 
follow suit—and the January 3, 2014 proposed rule suggests that new 
regulations may be forthcoming.214 
Finally, national standards require the development of 
streamlined processes. For example, instead of asking an incompetent 
beneficiary to designate a preferred fiduciary during the 
investigation,215 the Fiduciary Program could consider asking older 
 
 210. OFFICE OF AUDITS & EVALUATIONS, supra note 15, at 6. 
 211. See id. (noting that “VARO management said non-compliance by some VAROs was 
due to the lack of effective oversight and training of fiduciary staff,” and that “processing 
allegations of misuse is not part of the agency’s performance measures or part of staff and 
management performance standards,” nor was it “included in national quality reviews, which 
may provide a lack of incentive for VBA staff to thoroughly and timely review and investigate 
misuse allegations”). 
 212. Cf. Jill Kickul & Margaret Posig, Supervisory Emotional Support and Burnout: An 
Explanation of Reverse Buffering Effects, 13 J. MANAGERIAL ISSUES 328, 338–39 (2001) 
(describing the effect of unrealistic performance standards on employee performance). 
 213. See William L. Pine & William F. Russo, Making Veterans Benefits Clear: VA’s 
Regulation Rewrite Project, 61 ADMIN. L. REV. 407, 409–10 (2009) (discussing the VA’s Rewrite 
Project, which was an effort to reform regulations on the VA’s compensation and pension 
benefits programs). 
 214. The VA proposed to amend the Fiduciary Program regulations, opening the 
amendment for comment on January 3, 2014. Fiduciary Activities, 79 Fed. Reg. 430 (proposed 
Jan. 3, 2014) (to be codified at 38 C.F.R. pts. 3 and 13).  
 215. U.S. DEP’T OF VETERANS AFFAIRS, supra note 2, ch. 2, § D.11.c. 
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veterans to routinely identify their preferred fiduciary every three to 
five years, thereby reducing the difficulties inherent in selecting an 
appropriate fiduciary and increasing the likelihood that the selected 
fiduciary is someone the beneficiary would have chosen. Additionally, 
despite the concerns of the VA, the Fiduciary Program should 
seriously consider the benefits of recognizing a preselected fiduciary 
already designated by the beneficiary to possess a power of attorney 
(POA).216 Though the VA is absolutely correct in asserting that an 
individual with a POA should not be considered to the exclusion of 
all other candidates for fear that the document will bypass some of 
the Fiduciary Program’s most important safety features,217 a POA is a 
strong indicator of a beneficiary’s preferences and should be given 
some weight. At minimum then, the Program should develop a 
comprehensive process for approving or rejecting potential fiduciaries 
who already possess a POA. 
2. Training.  Staff at every level would benefit from more 
rigorous training. Studies conclude that leadership training has a 
positive impact on the effectiveness of organizations at every level.218 
 
 216. In Solze v. Shinseki, No. 12-1512, 2012 WL 3108837 (Aug. 1, 2012) (per curiam), the 
CAVC ordered argument be prepared on whether the VA is constitutionally or statutorily 
obligated to accept a durable POA as sufficient to establish a fiduciary relationship. Id. at *2; see 
also Solze v. Shinseki, No. 12,1512, 2012 WL 4801411, at *6 (Vet. App. Oct. 10, 2012) (ordering 
the Secretary of Veterans Affairs “to show cause as to why the Court should not determine that 
his actions violated [the plaintiff]’s right to due process under the Fifth Amendment”). 
Although the court ultimately did not have occasion to rule on the issue, it noted congressional 
concern with the VA’s apparent failure to give effect to its “policy . . . that they prefer family 
members and friends to serve as fiduciaries.” Solze v. Shinseki, 26 Vet. App. 118, 126 n.13 
(2013) (quoting Reforming VA’s Flawed Fiduciary System, supra note 17, at 2 (statement of 
Rep. Bill Johnson, Chairman, H. Subcomm. on Oversight & Investigations)). But see Reforming 
VA’s Flawed Fiduciary System, supra note 17, at 10 (statement of David McLenachen, Director 
of Pension and Fiduciary Service, U.S. Dep’t of Veterans Affairs) (arguing against reliance on a 
POA).  
 217. Reforming VA’s Flawed Fiduciary System, supra note 17, at 10 (statement of David 
McLenachen, Director of Pension and Fiduciary Service, U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs). 
 218. See Laura L. Methot, W. Larry Williams, Anne Cummings & Beth Bradshaw, 
Measuring the Effects of a Manager-Supervisor Training Program Through the Generalized 
Performance of Managers, Supervisors, Front-Line Staff and Clients in a Human Service Setting, 
16 J. ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. MGMT. 3, 20–21 (1996) (“[A] cost-effective supervisor training 
intervention can influence the supervisory process with effects that, in some cases, influence[] 
performance at other levels in the organization.”); Carol Woltring, Wendy Constantine & Liz 
Schwarte, Does Leadership Training Make a Difference? The CDU/UC Public Health 
Leadership Institute: 1991–1999, 9 J. PUB. HEALTH MGMT. & PRAC. 111, 125 (2003) (concluding 
that training provided by the Leadership Health Institute was successful “in enhancing the 
leadership capacities of senior public health leaders”). 
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Fiduciary Program managers, the first line of defense against ground-
staff noncompliance, have received training from the central office 
only three times since 1987 and have received no training since 
2004.219 Moreover, Fiduciary Program employees often attribute their 
noncompliance with Program guidelines to inexperience.220 By 
providing formal training for subject-matter experts, including the 
opportunity to work on mock cases, conduct practice interviews, and 
work on live cases under direct supervision,221 the Fiduciary Program 
could eliminate ignorance as an explanation for staff noncompliance. 
3. Adopting Strategies Used by Other Agencies.  The Fiduciary 
Program should learn from other federal agencies that perform 
similar functions. First, the Fiduciary Program should guide 
investigators who select surety bonds by emulating the Department of 
Labor, which requires all bonds used by ERISA fiduciaries to be 
provided by a surety approved by the Department of the Treasury.222 
By adopting the approach employed by the Department of Labor and 
requiring employees to adhere to only those preapproved sureties, 
the Fiduciary Program would reduce workload requirements by 
minimizing the time an employee would need to spend searching for 
an appropriate bonding agency. This improvement, in turn, would 
free up time for employees to focus on other issues. 
Second, the Fiduciary Program should copy the SSA by selecting 
a private company to perform credit and background checks. In 
response to a similar problem, the SSA hired Dunn & Bradstreet, a 
professional credit-check company, to perform background credit 
checks on all fiduciaries receiving a commission.223 The Fiduciary 
 
 219. OFFICE OF AUDITS & EVALUATIONS, supra note 15, at 13. 
 220. See id. at 17 (noting that in two of the three regional offices visited by the GAO, only 
33 percent of the staff had more than two years of experience).  
 221. See Examining the Fiduciary Program, supra note 17, at 22 (statement of Katherine R. 
Pflanz, Field Examiner, Winston-Salem Veterans Affairs Regional Office) (discussing the use of 
these methods in the training for her position as a veteran-service representative, as compared 
to the training she received as a field examiner for the fiduciary unit, where “formal training is 
not available”).  
 222. U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, FIELD ASSISTANCE BULLETIN, NO. 2008-04, GUIDANCE 
REGARDING ERISA FIDELITY BONDING REQUIREMENTS 3 (2008), available at 
http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/pdf/fab2008-4.pdf. For the Department of the Treasury’s list of 
acceptable sureties, see Department of the Treasury’s Listing of Certified Companies, FIN. 
MGMT. SERV. (July 23, 2013), http://www.fms.treas.gov/c570/C570-certified-comp-07-01-
2013.pdf. 
 223. Ensuring the Integrity of Social Security Programs: Protecting Seniors from 
Representative Payee Fraud: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Aging, 108th Cong. 14 (2003) 
BOSWORTH IN PP (FLIP) (DO NOT DELETE) 3/16/2014  8:21 PM 
2014] COMBATING PRIVATIZATION 1537 
Program should contract with a similar company to provide credit 
checks and background checks. Consistently using the same neutral 
party could economize the costs of contracting through a volume 
discount and increase the accuracy of the provided information by 
eliminating the opportunity for the fiduciary-applicant to lie. 
The Fiduciary Program should also adopt the SSA’s requirement 
that potential fiduciaries visit the local office. By shifting the travel 
burden from a Program employee to a potential fiduciary,224 the 
Fiduciary Program could decrease the commute time for employees, 
freeing up time to focus on other tasks. 
4. Use of Technology.  Already in the works for processing 
disability claims,225 a shift to a paperless tracking system would make 
it easier for employees to perform and for managers to review staff 
performance. For example, a paperless tracking system could include 
the ability to transmit and receive electronic accountings from 
fiduciaries, review previous accountings with a click of the mouse, 
access old records, and manage case files. In fact, since other agencies 
in the federal government are already using private companies to 
facilitate the transition into the digital era,226 such a change would be 
unlikely to face internal resistance if adopted by the Fiduciary 
Program. Moreover, an electronic database system set to save and 
back up data would help prevent the loss of important case data, 
thereby reducing the number of files without documentation and 
increasing compliance with the Fiduciary Program’s documentation 
policies. 
B. External Review 
Considering the host of problems plaguing the Fiduciary 
Program, many would expect reform to be a hot-button issue inside 
 
(statement of Frederick G. Streckewald, Assistant Deputy Comm’r, Social Security 
Administration). For articles discussing the SSA’s payee program, see supra note 23. 
 224. For discussion of current travel expectations for investigators, see supra note 123 and 
accompanying text.  
 225. See Emily Woodward Deutsch & Terrence T. Griffin, Parsing the Paperless Push: A 
Study of the Latest Efforts To Automate the Veterans’ Claims Process, 2 VETERANS L. REV. 117, 
126−29 (2010) (discussing the movement toward a paperless system as a solution to the backlog 
of claims). 
 226. See generally OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., SOC. SEC. ADMIN., A-04-08-18066, 
CONTRACT WITH LOCKHEED MARTIN GOVERNMENT SERVICES, INC. FOR DIGITAL IMAGING 
SERVICES: AUDIT REPORT (2008), available at http://oig.ssa.gov/sites/default/files/audit/full/
pdf/A-04-08-18066_7.pdf (discussing the transition to digital files in the SSA). 
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the Fiduciary Program’s management structure. In reality, senior 
management frequently overstates the Fiduciary Program’s successes 
and undermines the need for reform, promising change but rarely 
delivering. For instance, the VA OIG recommended that the 
Fiduciary Program develop a new version of the FBS and the 
Fiduciary Program concurred, promising that a workgroup would 
present its findings and recommendations by June 2010.227 As of 
March 2014, no record of a workgroup meeting could be found and 
no electronic database appears to be in the works. Similarly, after 
Congress demanded better training, the Fiduciary Program conducted 
a centralized pilot training program in 2011228 but made no further 
progress implementing the training nationwide. The Fiduciary 
Program’s struggles to make important changes suggest that some 
sort of external accountability is needed to ensure forward progress. 
This Note proposes that the best source for this external 
accountability derives not from traditional third parties such as 
Congress or the CAVC, but rather from alternative third parties. 
Third-party monitoring would increase the number of watchful eyes 
looking for indicators of misuse.229 This Note advocates for third-party 
participation at the federal and state levels through cooperation 
among federal agencies, parallel state-law enforcement, and vigorous 
litigation by veterans’ advocates. 
First, other federal agencies dealing with the same or similar 
situations could provide the Fiduciary Program with a second layer of 
accountability. The most obvious option is the SSA, specifically the 
branch of the agency called the Representative Payee Program. 
Although the SSA operates the Representative Payee Program under 
different federal law,230 this SSA program performs basically the same 
function as the VA’s Fiduciary Program, just under the direction of a 
different administrative agency.231 Both programs share the same 
basic mandate, and the programs sometimes have incapacitated 
 
 227. OFFICE OF AUDITS & EVALUATIONS, supra note 15, at 31–32. 
 228. Reforming VA’s Flawed Fiduciary System, supra note 17, at 6 (testimony of David 
McLenachen, Director of Pension and Fiduciary Service, U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs). 
 229. Cf. Margaret H. Lemos, State Enforcement of Federal Law, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 698, 
701−03 (2011) (discussing the benefits of state enforcement of federal law).  
 230. 42 U.S.C. § 1007 (2006). 
 231. GAO, INCAPACITATED ADULTS, supra note 18, at 3; see also CONSUMER FIN. PROT. 
BUREAU, MANAGING SOMEONE ELSE’S MONEY: HELP FOR REPRESENTATIVE PAYEES AND 
VA FIDUCIARIES 8 (2013), available at http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201310_cfpb_
lay_fiduciary_guides_representative.pdf (treating fiduciaries and representative payees 
similarly). 
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beneficiaries in common.232 Creating an information exchange 
between the SSA and the VA for joint fiduciaries would improve 
monitoring and facilitate more accurate information about potential 
fiduciaries.233  
Second, state law should also be utilized as an independent check 
on the performance of fiduciaries by providing a secondary 
mechanism to address fiduciary fraud.234 Most states provide a 
common-law civil remedy for a breach of a fiduciary duty,235 and some 
states have even enacted specific statutory language addressing 
abuses of the fiduciary relationship.236 Although there are few cases in 
which a beneficiary successfully sues his fiduciary for breach of 
fiduciary duty or fraud, at least one state court has entertained such a 
suit.237 Moreover, rather than rubberstamping the VA’s choice of 
fiduciaries, state courts could rely on state-law requirements for 
guardians to bar the selection of unqualified VA fiduciaries.238 States 
could also modify criminal statutes to explicitly penalize VA 
fiduciaries for stealing from beneficiaries. Although some states 
already penalize financial exploitation of the elderly or the disabled,239 
codifying a specific crime related to exploitation of incompetent 
beneficiaries as identified by the VA could serve as a jurisdictional 
hook for state prosecution of fraudulent fiduciaries. Such criminal 
provisions, in turn, could allow states to protect incompetent veterans 
concurrently with the federal government, thereby providing 
 
 232. GAO, INCAPACITATED ADULTS, supra note 18, at 11. 
 233. Id. 
 234. Cf. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 874 (1979) (violation of a fiduciary duty). For 
a general description of Restatement section 87, see Deborah A. DeMott, Breach of Fiduciary 
Duty: On Justifiable Expectations of Loyalty and Their Consequences, 48 ARIZ. L. REV. 925, 
927–34 (2006). 
 235. See 37 AM. JUR. 2D Fraud and Deceit §§ 34–39 (2013) (discussing fiduciary fraud in 
depth).  
 236. See, e.g., GA. CODE. ANN. § 29-5-93 (West 2007); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 356A.09 (West 
2012). 
 237. See Conservatorship Estate of K.H. v. Cont’l Ins. Co., 73 P.3d 588, 589 (Alaska 2003) 
(allowing the beneficiary’s new fiduciary to sue the old fiduciary for breach of fiduciary duty 
and fraud). These suits may not be very popular because the fraudulent fiduciaries lack 
resources to justify the expense of the suit. 
 238. See, e.g., Estate of Dickson, No. DP-92-56, 1998 Mont. Dist. LEXIS 850, at *12–13 (Jud. 
Dist. Ct. Mont. Dec. 4, 1998) (refusing to grant “sham appointments of conservators” proposed 
by the VA).  
 239. See, e.g., 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/17-56 (Supp. 2013).  
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substantial enforcement benefits.240 Whether or not federal law 
preempts state enforcement of these suits is still a matter of debate.241 
These concerns, however, may be alleviated if the agency has already 
identified that a fraud has occurred.242 
Third, it is important to remember that new sources of external 
accountability should not replace traditional mechanisms of private 
enforcement. Veterans’ advocates must continue to advance the 
interests of incompetent beneficiaries. First, there is the possibility of 
raising a system-wide challenge to the Fiduciary Program’s lack of 
procedure. The Ninth Circuit, in Veterans for Common Sense v. 
Shinseki,243 held that the VJRA did not bar organizational plaintiffs 
from challenging the absence of system-wide procedures used by the 
VA to select and monitor fiduciaries, procedures which would be 
necessary for due process.244 Although an individual veteran can use 
the judicial mechanism defined by the VJRA, organizational plaintiffs 
cannot bring suit in the CAVC, and that court cannot claim exclusive 
jurisdiction over the suit.245 Though this theory has yet to be tested in 
the context of the Fiduciary Program, an organizational claim could 
provide veterans’ advocates with a mechanism to challenge the entire 
Program in one instance and outside the CAVC pipeline. Second, the 
negligence cause of action provided under federal law could be used 
to address the very types of abuse that are so problematic in the 
Fiduciary Program.246 Between 2008 and 2012, however, a VA 
spokesperson indicated that only fifteen beneficiaries have been 
compensated under that cause of action.247 The Fiduciary Program 
disfavors reimbursements, forcing advocates to fight tooth-and-nail to 
 
 240. See Lemos, supra note 229, at 717−36 (discussing the benefits of state enforcement as 
compared to federal enforcement). 
 241. See Louis M. Bograd & Andre M. Mura, Buckman Stops Here! Limits on Preemption 
of State Tort Claims Involving Allegations of Fraud on the PTO or the FDA, 41 RUTGERS L.J. 
309, 309–10 (2009) (arguing that federal law should not preempt plaintiffs’ state-law claims 
“[w]here plaintiffs allege, and can offer evidence of, fraud on [an agency] plus all of the 
necessary elements of a traditional state-law cause,” but that claims may be preempted “where 
plaintiffs nakedly allege fraud on the agency, without the essential elements of a recognized 
state-law claim”). 
 242. See generally Catherine M. Sharkey, The Fraud Caveat to Agency Preemption, 102 NW. 
U. L. REV. 841 (2008) (arguing that allowing state enforcement when the agency identifies fraud 
should alleviate preemption concerns).  
 243. Veterans for Common Sense v. Shinseki, 678 F.3d 1013 (9th Cir. 2012). 
 244. Id. at 1034–35. 
 245. Id. at 1035. 
 246. See supra notes 59–60 and accompanying text.  
 247. Nalder & Olsen, supra note 105. 
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prove jurisdiction; for this reason, the system’s ultimate efficacy 
requires the work of diligent advocates who are willing to push back 
against the decisions made by Fiduciary Program employees.248 In 
addition to providing beneficiaries with an alternative way to recover 
lost money, especially when the fiduciary failed to acquire a surety 
bond, increased negligence suits could place a much-needed spotlight 
on the Fiduciary Program’s struggles. 
CONCLUSION 
The Fiduciary Program was developed to protect those who 
sacrificed so much to guard the United States and who now, due to 
disease, illness, or infirmity, cannot protect themselves. As long as the 
Fiduciary Program continues in its current state, however, 
incompetent beneficiaries will remain susceptible to abuse by 
unsavory fiduciaries. Neither Congress nor the CAVC can effectively 
remedy this program. Instead, other actors must step up to make the 
Fiduciary Program function effectively. To facilitate actual 
improvement, the Fiduciary Program should adopt institutional 
reforms that address the underlying management and resource issues 
preventing compliance with Program regulations, and, in the process, 
it should also adopt new mechanisms to clarify internal policies. 
Additionally, external entities, such as other federal agencies and the 
states, must be given a seat at the table to provide additional 
oversight to ensure Program compliance. Only a system that 
prioritizes internal reform and encourages external accountability will 
be able to fulfill the Fiduciary Program’s mandate: protecting the 
most vulnerable members of the veteran population from abuse. 
 
 248. See Freeman v. Shinseki, 24 Vet. App. 404, 405–06 (2011) (per curiam) (noting the 
jurisdictional hurdles advocates had to surmount to establish jurisdiction in any court).  
